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a b s t r a c t
A social choice rule is said to be mixed Bayesian implementable if one can design a mechanism
(or institution) in which the set of all mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with
that specified by the rule. The objective of this paper is to generalize the results of mixed Bayesian
implementation. By means of example, I first assess the implication of common priors in Bayesian
implementation. Second, I identify a mild condition that fills the gap between the necessity and
sufficiency for mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments including non-economic ones.
Third, I establish some new results to unify the literature of Bayesian implementation and Nash
implementation.
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The theory of implementation or mechanism design attempts
to identify the conditions under which a social choice rule (or
welfare criterion) may be decentralized through some institution
(or mechanism). In contexts in which the planner knows what
agents’ preferences and/or beliefs (henceforth, I call them types
collectively) might be, but does not know what they actually are,
the theory has uncovered necessary and sufficient conditions for
such decentralization.1
We say that a social choice rule is partially implementable by
some mechanism if the mechanism possesses a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium whose outcome is contained in that specified by
the rule. We often appeal to the revelation principle, which says
✩ This paper is formerly titled ‘‘Interim Equilibrium Implementation.’’ This
work was initiated while I was a visiting scholar at NUS (National University
of Singapore). I am gratefully thankful to NUS Economics department for its
hospitality. I am indebted to anonymous referees and the editor of the journal for
detailed comments and suggestions that significantly improved the paper. This
paper also has benefited greatly from the comments of Yi-Chun Chen, Michihiro
Kandori, Hitoshi Matsushima, Roberto Serrano, Satoru Takahashi, Qianfeng Tang,
Rajiv Vohra, Takuma Wakayama, and seminar participants at Academia Sinica,
AMES in Singapore, Concordia University, Keio University, NUS, SAET Conference
in Paris, SHUFE, and University of Tokyo. I acknowledge financial support
from JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 24330078 and 25780128, Japan Center for
Economic Research, and Yamada Academic Research Fund.
E-mail address: tkunimoto@smu.edu.sg.
1 For surveys on implementation theory, see, for example, Jackson (2001) and
Serrano (2004).
that whenever partial implementation is possible, one can always
duplicate the same equilibrium outcome by using the truthful
equilibrium in the direct revelation mechanism where each agent
announces his type to the planner. Thus, a necessary condition
for the implementation of any welfare criterion is its incentive
compatibility: the best thing for each individual to do in the direct
revelation mechanism is to report his true type as long as all other
individuals truthfully announce their type.
Although the revelation principle has been a powerful tool
in many applications, it is important to realize that the direct-
revelation mechanism may possess other untruthful equilibria
whose outcomes are not consistent with the welfare criterion.
In order to take seriously the problems resulting from the mul-
tiplicity of equilibria, some researchers have turned to the ques-
tion of full Bayesian implementation, and explored the conditions
under which the set of Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes
coincides with a given welfare criterion. In the case of full im-
plementation, Bayesian monotonicity emerges, in addition to in-
centive compatibility. Indeed, full implementation is the concept
of implementation this paper adopts.
The main objective of this paper is to generalize the results of
full Bayesian implementation established in Jackson (1991) and
Serrano and Vohra (henceforth, SV, 2010). Theorem 1 of Jackson
(1991) shows that under the economic condition, which basically
says that at least two agents can never be satiated, a social choice
rule satisfies incentive compatibility, Bayesian monotonicity, and
closure (to be defined in Section 5) if and only if it is fully Bayesian
implementable. Jackson’s Theorem 1 restricts attention to the
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.003
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setup where (1) each agent only uses pure strategies; (2) mecha-
nisms are deterministic; and (3) the type space is finite. SV (2010)
extend this result to the setup where the agents can use mixed
strategies; mechanisms are stochastic; and the type space is quite
general. More specifically, Theorem 1 of SV (2010) shows that
in economic environments, mixed Bayesian implementation is
equivalent to incentive compatibility, closure, andmixed Bayesian
monotonicity, which is a strengthening of Bayesian monotonic-
ity. The main contribution of this paper is to further generalize
Theorem 1 of SV (2010) by dropping the economic condition. I
consider this as a major addition to the literature because outside
of economic environments, tight characterizations are generally
not available, even for pure strategy equilibria. Note that Theorem
2 of Jackson (1991) proposes a sufficient condition for (pure)
Bayesian implementation in ‘‘non-economic’’ environments. The
table below depicts where the contribution of this paper lies in
the literature:
Pure strategies Mixed strategies
deterministic
mechanisms
stochastic mechanisms
finite type space general type space
Economic
environments
Theorem 1 of Jackson
(1991)
SV (2010)
Non-Economic
environments
Theorem 2 of Jackson
(1991)
This paper
The main result of this paper is to identify a mild condition un-
der which one can fully characterize mixed Bayesian implementa-
tion in general environments including non-economic ones. More
formally:
Theorem. Suppose that there are at least three agents and a given
social choice rule satisfies the no-worst-rule condition (NWR). Then,
the social choice rule is mixed Bayesian implementable if and only
if it satisfies incentive compatibility, mixed Bayesian monotonicity,
and closure.
The no-worst-rule condition (NWR) is considered a version
of no-total-indifference condition, which basically says that the
environment is rich enough so that every type never be in-
different over the outcomes. I will later argue that NWR is a
mild condition and illustrate its permissiveness by means of an
example (Example 2). Another aspect of the contribution of this
paper is to propose a unified treatment among different setups:
I handle (i) the case of two agents (Theorem 2), (ii) the case
of ‘‘single-valued’’ social choice rules (Theorem 3), and (iii) the
case of complete information, which describes the situation in
which the underlying state is always commonly known among
the agents. In complete information environments, I identify a
condition much weaker than NWR under which one can fully
characterize mixed Nash implementation in general environments
including non-economic ones (Theorem 4).2
I move on to the last aspect of the generalization this paper
executes. In most of applications in mechanism design and im-
plementation theory, the researchers invoke the common prior
assumption, which requires that all agents share the common be-
lief about the state at the ex ante stage. I therefore investigate the
implication of common priors in mixed Bayesian implementation.
By Example 1, I confirm that if the common prior assumption
2 See Section 8 for the precise definition of Nash implementation.
is violated, Bayesian Nash equilibrium loses its predictive power
quite a lot. In Section 6, building upon an example of Palfrey
and Srivastava (1989b), I argue that mixed Bayesian monotonicity
can be more permissive when the common prior assumption is
violated than when it is satisfied.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 clarifies
the scope of the current paper in the literature. In Section 3,
I introduce the general setup for the paper. In Section 4, I in-
troduce the concept of mixed Bayesian implementation. In Sec-
tion 5, I identify the necessary conditions for implementation. In
Section 6, I illustrate all the necessary conditions for implementa-
tion by means of an example. Section 7 provides a set of sufficient
conditions for mixed Bayesian implementation. In Section 8, I
restrict attention to complete information environments and ob-
tain the sufficiency result for Nash implementation. Section 9
concludes. In the Appendix, I provide all the proofs omitted from
the main body of the paper and discuss how one can extend this
paper’s analysis to a more general setup.
2. Related literature and the scope of the paper
The current paper contributes to unifying the literature of
Bayesian implementation and Nash implementation. In what fol-
lows, I will be clear about all the aspects of the generalizations
the current paper executes. However, those who are mainly in-
terested in the main results of this paper can skip this section and
immediately move to Section 3.
2.1. Type space
Assuming that the payoff-relevant parameter space is Polish,
Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) construct the so-called universal
type space that consists of all coherent belief hierarchies, which
is also Polish.3 Since this paper’s type space can be Polish, it
becomes quite general, as it can be interpreted as the universal
type space. Duggan (1997) and SV (2010) consider an even more
general type space. This paper’s topological assumption is only
needed for the sufficiency results in Sections 7 and 8. In contrast,
Jackson (1991) restricts attention to a finite type space.
This paper assumes that the underlying type space is common
knowledge among the planner and the agents. This common
knowledge assumption is often seen as unrealistic so that one
seeks for robust implementation, which requires that implemen-
tation survive any specification of higher-order beliefs consistent
with the common knowledge structure of the environment. See
Artemov et al. (2013) and Bergemann and Morris (2009, 2011) for
robust implementation.
2.2. Multi-valued social choice rules
Many researchers focus on single-valued social choice rules,
i.e., social choice functions (SCFs). However, the restriction to
functions often turns out to be severe constraints on its im-
plementability (See Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) and Saijo
(1987)). Therefore, to obtain more permissive implementation
results, the literature considers multi-valued social choice rules,
i.e., social choice sets (SCSs). In fact, many interesting SCSs satisfy
Maskin monotonicity: the Pareto, Core, Walrasian, Envy-Free,
Lindhal, all these SCSs satisfy it. On the other hand, any social
choice ‘‘function’’ selected from these SCSs no longer satisfies
Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, Bayesian monotonicity is known
3 A Polish space is a separable, completely metrizable topological space.
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to be a quite restrictive condition even for SCSs.4 The current
paper handles the case of SCSs as well as SCFs.
2.3. Domain restrictions
The property upon which this paper relies is the no-worst-rule
condition (NWR). Note that NWR is stronger than the no-total-
indifference condition used by SV (2010). While this paper does
not need it at all, SV (2010) need Jackson’s (1991) economic con-
dition, which essentially says that at least two agents can never be
simultaneously satiated. Moreover, Abreu and Matsushima (1992,
1994) use an assumption that plays essentially the same role of
small side payments.5 Theorems 1 and 2 of the current paper
show that one can do away with the economic condition but
rather need a version of no-total-indifference condition.
2.4. Mechanisms
While many classical papers only deal with ‘‘deterministic’’
mechanisms, some papers consider ‘‘stochastic’’ mechanisms.6
This paper’s stochastic mechanisms draw upon the constructions
proposed by Bergemann et al. (2011) and Oury and Tercieux
(2012).
The current paper exploits the nature of infinite mechanisms.
One obvious benefit of utilizing infinite mechanisms is that one
can close the gap between the necessity and sufficiency for im-
plementability. See Abreu and Matsushima (1992, 1994) and Chen
et al. (2016) for the use of finite implementing mechanisms.
2.5. Mixed strategy
The theory of implementation has often left out the consider-
ation of mixed strategy equilibria. This is particularly problematic
for a research program that attempts to address the problem
of multiplicity of equilibria in mechanisms.7 Jackson (1992, Sec-
tion 5.2) argues most eloquently that ignoring mixed strategies
becomes a serious problem.
SV (2010) seriously tackle the issue of mixed strategy equilib-
ria by stochastic mechanisms. On the other hand, Maskin (1999)
uses deterministic mechanisms, but requires each outcome in the
support of any mixed strategy equilibrium to be in the social
choice rule. This paper follows the approach of SV (2010). In
virtual implementation, Abreu and Matsushima (1992) handle
mixed strategies explicitly and Duggan (1997) argues that the
difference between pure and mixed strategies goes away because
one can construct a sufficiently large type space and perform a
purification of any mixed strategy equilibrium.8 In robust im-
plementation, Bergemann and Morris (2009, 2011) and Artemov
et al. (2013) appeal to a similar argument of Duggan (1997).
4 For instance, Chakravorti (1992) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) show
that Bayesian monotonicity is very restrictive even for the case of SCSs.
5 Furthermore, Matsushima (1993) explicitly assumes that side payments are
available to show that Bayesian monotonicity is generically a vacuous constraint
and Artemov et al. (2013) and Bergemann and Morris (2009) also need a similar
assumption of Abreu and Matsushima (1992) for robust virtual implementation.
6 For stochastic mechanisms, see also Matsushima (1993) and SV (2010)
in Bayesian implementation; Bergemann et al. (2011) in implementation in
rationalizable strategies; Bergemann and Morris (2011) in robust exact imple-
mentation; and Artemov et al. (2013) and Bergemann and Morris (2009) in
robust virtual implementation.
7 In fact, Jackson (1991), Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Mookherjee and
Reichelstein (1990) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1987, 1989a) all consider ‘‘pure’’
strategies only.
8 A mixed strategy equilibrium is purified if there exist a sequence of Bayesian
games and a sequence of pure strategy equilibria such that the mixed strategy
equilibrium is close to the limit of the associated sequence of pure strategy
equilibria.
2.6. Complete information or not
Historically, the literature of implementation theory pays spe-
cial attention to complete information environments in which
the underlying state is always commonly certain among all the
agents. The current paper deals with incomplete information
environments and treats complete information ones as a spe-
cial case of the former. From this unified perspective, I show
that moving from incomplete to complete information environ-
ments, one can weaken mixed Bayesian monotonicity and NWR
into Maskin monotonicity and the no-worst-alternative (NWA)
condition (to be defined in Section 8), respectively.
3. Preliminaries
I consider the implementation problem in environments with
incomplete information. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the finite
set of agents and Ti be the set of types of agent i. Throughout
the paper, I assume that Ti is a finite space.9 Denote T ≡ T1 ×
· · · × Tn, and T−i ≡ T1 × · · · × Ti−1 × Ti+1 × · · · × Tn.10 Let
∆(T−i) denote the set of probability distributions on T−i. Each
agent i has a system of ‘‘interim’’ beliefs that is expressed as a
function πi : Ti → ∆(T−i). Then, I call (Ti, πi)i∈N a type space.
Let A denote a finite set of pure outcomes, which are assumed
to be independent of the information state.11 Let ∆(A) be the set
of probability distributions on A. Agent i’s state dependent von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function is denoted ui : ∆(A) ×
T → R. I now define an environment as E = (A, {ui, Ti, πi}i∈N),
which is implicitly understood to be common knowledge among
the agents.
A subset of T is called an event. An event E = E1×· · ·×En ⊆ T
is said to be belief-closed if, for each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ei, we have∑
t−i∈E−i πi(ti)[t−i] = 1. In words, if an event E is a belief-closed
subspace, it is commonly certain among all agents that E obtains.
Throughout the paper I assume that the planner (or mechanism
designer) only cares about the subset of the type space (T ∗i )i∈N
where T ∗i ⊆ Ti. This paper takes (T ∗i , πi)i∈N as an arbitrarily
belief-closed subspace of (Ti, πi)i∈N .12 As in the case of complete
information settings, for example, T ∗ may be a proper subset of
T .
A (stochastic) social choice function (SCF) is a function f : T →
∆(A). Let F = {f | f : T → ∆∗(A)} be the set of SCFs, where ∆∗(A)
is defined as a finite subset of∆(A). The finiteness of F is imposed
simply to avoid the measurability issue.13 This paper is mainly
concerned with social choice sets (SCSs), which are ‘‘multi-valued’’
social choice rules. An SCS F is defined as a nonempty subset of
F. Since F is finite, any SCS F , which is a nonempty subset of F, is
also finite. Two SCSs F and H are said to be equivalent (F ≈ H) if
there exists a bijection ξ : F → H such that for every f ∈ F and
every h ∈ H satisfying h = ξ (f ), f (t) = h(t) for all t ∈ T ∗. This
means that the two SCSs ‘‘coincide’’ for every t ∈ T ∗.
A mechanism (or game form) Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) describes a
nonempty countable message space Mi for each agent i and an
9 In the Appendix, I discuss the extension of my analysis to a Polish space
Ti associated with its Borel σ -algebra Ti .
10 Similar notation will be used for products of other sets.
11 In the Appendix, I extend the analysis to a more general set of A associated
with its σ -algebra A containing all singleton sets.
12 For example, Jackson (1991) assumes that all agents have a common
support prior over T . Then, T ∗ is interpreted as the set of profiles of types to
which agents assign strictly positive probability. SV (2010) also make the same
assumption.
13 In the Appendix, I define F = {f | f : T → ∆(A)} as the set of all SCFs such
that ∆∗(A) is replaced by ∆(A) and T is replaced by (Ti,Ti)i∈N .
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outcome function g : M → ∆(A), where M = ×i∈NMi.14
Let Γ DR = ((Ti)i∈N , f ) denote the direct revelation mechanism
associated with an SCF f .
The interim expected utility of agent i of type ti that pretends
to be of type t ′i in the direct-revelation mechanism associated
with an SCF f , provided all other agents are truthful is defined
as:
Ui(f ; t ′i |ti) ≡
∑
t−i
πi[ti](t−i)ui(f (t ′i , t−i)); (ti, t−i).
Denote Ui(f |ti) = Ui(f ; ti|ti).
4. Mixed Bayesian implementation
I shall introduce the concept of mixed Bayesian implementa-
tion. Given a mechanism Γ = (M, g), let Γ (T ) denote an incom-
plete information game associated with a type space (Ti, πi)i∈N .
Let σi(·|ti) ∈ ∆(Mi) denote the probability measure over Mi
conditional upon ti. Besides, I denote by σ (·|t) =∏j∈N σj(·|tj) ∈∏
j∈N ∆
∗(Mj) the product measure over M conditional upon t . I
denote by supp(σ (·|t)) the support of probability measure σ (·|t)
on M . Similar notation will be used for other probability mea-
sures. I let
Ui(g ◦ (σ ′i , σ−i)|ti) ≡
∑
t−i
πi[ti](t−i)
∑
m−i
σ−i(t−i)[m−i]
×
∑
mi
σ ′i (ti)[mi]ui(g(mi,m−i); (ti, t−i)).
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a solution concept this paper
adopts.
Definition 1 (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game Γ (T ) if, for each
i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti, and strategy σ ′i ∈ Σi,
Ui(g ◦ σ |ti) ≥ Ui(g ◦ (σ ′i , σ−i)|ti).
Given an incomplete information game Γ (T ), let BNEΓ (T ) be
the collection of strategy profiles such that each σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game Γ (T ).
Here I introduce the concepts of common support priors and
common priors as extra restrictions on agents’ interim beliefs.
Definition 2. A type space (Ti, πi)i∈N is said to be the one with
common support priors if there exists a collection of priors
{pi}i∈N with each pi ∈ ∆(T ) satisfying the following two prop-
erties: (1) πi(ti) = pi(·|ti) ∈ ∆(T−i) for any i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti where
pi(·|ti) denotes the probability distribution on T−i conditional
upon ti and (2) all agents’ priors agree on the zero-probability
events: for each i, j ∈ N and each tˆ ∈ T , pi(tˆ) = 0 if and only
if pj(tˆ) = 0. Moreover, a type space (Ti, πi)i∈N is said to be the
one with a common prior if it is the one with common support
priors and there exists p ∈ ∆(T ) such that pi(·) = p(·) for each
i ∈ N .
Remark. The common support assumption means that at the ex
ante stage, all agents agree on the zero-probability events. Lipman
(2003) shows that this common support condition is equivalent
to the common prior assumption in a ‘‘finite’’ type space.
I illustrate the role of common prior as well as common
supports in Bayesian Nash equilibrium by means of an example.
By this example, I do not claim its novelty. The whole purpose of
14 In the Appendix, I discuss how the analysis can be extended to a more
general class of mechanisms.
this example is to make a simple point. That is, the set of BNE on
a common prior space differs significantly from the set of BNE on
a space without a common prior. I connect the role of common
priors and common supports to the necessary conditions of mixed
Bayesian implementation in Section 6.
Example 1. We consider an incomplete information game Γ (T )
in which (1) N = {1, 2} as the set of agents; (2) A = {a1, a2} as the
set of pure alternatives; (3)Mi = {mi,m′i} for each i ∈ N as the set
of actions available for agent i; (4) g(m1,m2) = g(m′1,m′2) = a1
and g(m1,m′2) = g(m′1,m2) = a2; (5) Ti = {ti, t ′i } as the set of
types for each agent i ∈ N; (4) each agent’s utility function is
given: u1(a1; t) = 1 > −1 = u1(a2; t) and u2(a1; t) = −1 < 1 =
u2(a2; t) for each t ∈ T = T1 × T2; and (6) each agent i’s interim
beliefs over T−i are: π1(t1)[t2] = 1;π1(t ′1)[t ′2] = 1;π2(t2)[t ′1] = 1;
and π2(t ′2)[t1] = 1.
Note that the type space T is a belief-closed space in which the
two agents have beliefs with completely disjoint support., i.e., the
common support assumption is clearly violated. Consider the
following strategy profile σ : σ1(t1) = m1; σ1(t ′1) = m′1; σ2(t2) =
m2; and σ2(t ′2) = m′2. It is easy to see that σ constitutes a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium because each σi achieves the best
possible payoff for every type against σ−i given his interim belief
πi.
Since the agents’ utility functions are commonly certain be-
tween the agents, each type ti ∈ Ti plays the role of a payoff-
irrelevant signal only observable to agent i. This means that
Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ here can be considered a subjective
correlated equilibrium in which the type space constitutes a
correlating device. The underlying complete information game is
a 2× 2 zero-sum game so that each player has the unique optimal
strategy where he chooses each pure action with equal proba-
bility. It is well known that in a two-person zero-sum game, all
correlated equilibria are convex combinations of pairs of optimal
strategies.15 Therefore, in this example, there is the unique cor-
related equilibrium in which each player uses his unique optimal
strategy. We therefore conclude that once we impose the com-
mon prior assumption on T , σ no longer constitutes a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
When the set of Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes is re-
quired to exactly coincide with those picked by the SCS, I speak of
mixed Bayesian implementation, which is proposed by SV (2010).
Definition 3 (Mixed Bayesian Implementation). An SCS F is mixed
Bayesian implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ = (M, g)
such that g ◦BNEΓ (T ) ≈ F . More specifically, this requirement can
be decomposed into the following two properties: (1) for each
f ∈ F , there exists σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ) such that g ◦ σ ≈ f ; and (2) for
each σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ), there exists fˆ ∈ F such that g ◦ σ ≈ fˆ .
5. Necessity for mixed Bayesian implementation
In this section, I discuss the necessary conditions for mixed
Bayesian implementation. First, I start from incentive compatibil-
ity.
Definition 4. An SCS F satisfies incentive compatibility if, for
each f ∈ F , i ∈ N , and ti, t ′i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |ti) ≥ Ui(f ; t ′i |ti).
The proposition below is already proved by Jackson (1991).
Proposition 1. If an SCS F is mixed Bayesian implementable, it
satisfies incentive compatibility.
15 See, for example, footnote 14 of Aumann (1987).
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A deception is a collection β = (βi)i∈N , where each βi : Ti →
2Ti\{∅}. Let β(t) = (β1(t1), . . . , βn(tn)). Write f ◦ β ∈ F if there
exist F˜ and f˜ ∈ F˜ such that F ≈ F˜ and f ◦β ≈ f˜ . Otherwise, Write
f ◦ β /∈ F . I introduce mixed Bayesian monotonicity proposed by
SV (2010).
Definition 5. An SCS F satisfies mixed Bayesian monotonicity
if, for every f ∈ F , every deception β for which f ◦ β /∈ F , and
every collection of {ψk}k∈N with each ψk : Tk → ∆(Tk) such that
for each k ∈ N and tk ∈ Tk,
ψk(t ′k|tk) > 0⇔ t ′k ∈ βk(tk),
there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and a function y∗ : T−i → ∆(A) such
that
Ui(y∗ ◦ ψ−i|ti) > Ui(f ◦ ψ |ti)
where ψ−i =∏j̸=i ψj : T−i →∏j̸=i∆(Tk) and for all t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y∗|t˜i).
The direct-revelation mechanism might possess untruthful
equilibria as well as the truthful one. Then, mixed Bayesian mono-
tonicity can be considered a condition that knocks out untruthful
equilibria without upsetting the truthful equilibrium. This implies
that, with the help of mixed Bayesian monotonicity, we are
guided clearly how to augment the direct revelation mechanism
by adding ‘‘objection’’ as an extra message to the right agent (a
whistle-blower) so that we sustain the truthful equilibrium, while
upsetting untruthful equilibria in the augmented mechanism.
This augmentation process is reflected in the construction of the
mechanism in the proof of Theorem 1.
To fix the idea, imagine that each agent k employs a mixed
strategy ψk in the direct revelation mechanism and β describes
the support of the strategy profile ψ . Whenever ψ generates an
undesirable outcome (i.e., f ◦β /∈ F ), mixed Bayesian monotonicity
guarantees the existence of a test agent i of type ti and an SCF
y∗ such that type ti can be a whistle-blower by being provided
y∗ rather than f ◦ ψ if and only if the other agents in fact play
ψ−i. The next proposition for the necessity of mixed Bayesian
monotonicity is already proved by SV (2010).
Proposition 2. If an SCS F is mixed Bayesian implementable, then
it satisfies mixed Bayesian monotonicity.
I introduce a simpler class of deceptions which is often consid-
ered in the literature. β is called a single-valued deception if it is
a deception and βi : Ti → Ti for each i ∈ N . If only single-valued
deceptions are considered in the definition of mixed Bayesian
monotonicity, I call the corresponding concept simply Bayesian
monotonicity used by Jackson (1991).
Definition 6. An SCS F satisfies Bayesian monotonicity if, for
every f ∈ F and every single-valued deception β for which
f ◦β /∈ F , there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and a function y∗ : T−i → ∆(A)
such that
Ui(y∗ ◦ β−i|ti) > Ui(f ◦ β|ti),
where β−i =∏j̸=i βj and for all t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y∗|t˜i).
SV (2010) introduce the following condition which clarifies the
difference between mixed Bayesian monotonicity and Bayesian
monotonicity.
Definition 7. An SCS F satisfies the convex range property if,
whenever it is true that for f ∈ F and a collection of single-valued
deceptions {βλ} indexed by λ, one has that f ◦ βλ ∈ F for each
λ, then it is true that for every (not necessarily single-valued)
deception β˜ , if β˜ =⋃λ βλ, then one has that f ◦ β˜ ∈ F .
Remark. It is easy to see that every ‘‘SCF’’ trivially satisfies this
property.
I show an equivalence between mixed Bayesian monotonicity
and Bayesian monotonicity.16
Proposition 3. Suppose that an SCS F satisfies the convex range
property and incentive compatibility. Then, F satisfies mixed
Bayesian monotonicity if and only if it satisfies Bayesian monotonic-
ity.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. ■
I need some preparation for introducing the last necessary
condition I consider for SCSs. For a belief-closed subspace E ⊆ T
and an SCS F , define
F (E) ≡ {α ∈ ∆(A)⏐⏐ ∃ f ∈ F , ∃t ∈ Es.t. f (t) = α} .
For two belief-closed subspaces E, E ′ ⊆ T and an SCS F , define
F (E × E ′) ≡ {(α, α′)⏐⏐ ∃f ∈ F , ∃t ∈ E, ∃t ′ ∈ E ′
s.t. f (t) = α and f (t ′) = α′} .
Definition 8. An SCS F satisfies closure if, for any pair of belief-
closed subspaces E, E ′ ⊆ T , we have
F (E × E ′) = F (E)× F (E ′).
In words, closure says that Bayesian Nash equilibria should
not depend upon any extra correlation between two belief-closed
subspaces. The next result shows that closure is a necessary
condition for mixed Bayesian implementation. See Jackson (1991)
and Palfrey and Srivastava (1993) for the proof.
Proposition 4. If an SCS F is mixed Bayesian implementable, it
satisfies closure.
6. An example
I build my argument on an important example (Example 3
of Palfrey and Srivastava, 1989a,b) to show the permissiveness
of the necessary conditions for implementation.17 There are two
pure outcomes, A = {a, b} and three agents, N = {1, 2, 3}. Each
agent i has two possible types, Ti = {ta, tb} and each type is drawn
independently such that tb is chosen with probability q ∈ (0, 1)
and I assume q2 > 1/2. Therefore, for each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti, type
ti’s interim belief πi[ti] is provided as follows: for any t−i ∈ T−i,
πi[ti](t−i) =
⎧⎨⎩ q
2 if t−i = (tb, tb)
q(1− q) if t−i = (tb, ta) or (ta, tb)
(1− q)2 if t−i = (ta, ta)
Note that these interim beliefs can be derived from a com-
mon prior p ∈ ∆(T ) such that p(tb, tb, tb) = q3; p(tb, tb, ta) =
p(tb, ta, tb) = p(ta, tb, tb) = q2(1 − q); p(tb, ta, ta) = p(ta, tb, ta) =
p(ta, ta, tb) = q(1 − q)2; and p(ta, ta, ta) = (1 − q)3. Agents have
identical preferences such that for each i ∈ N and t ∈ T ,
ui(a; t) =
{
1 if at least two agents are of type ta,
0 otherwise;
16 Proposition 1 of SV (2010) shows the same result but without incentive
compatibility. I found that the logic of their argument does not go through
without incentive compatibility. Here I only claim that incentive compatibility
is sufficient and essential for this result but I do not claim its necessity.
17 This example was also extensively discussed in Kunimoto and Serrano
(2011) and SV (2005).
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ui(b, t) =
{
1 if at least two agents are of type tb,
0 otherwise.
Let E = (A, {ui, Ti, πi}i∈N ) denote the corresponding environment.
For each agent i ∈ N , the corresponding interim utilities for the
constant SCFs assigning outcomes a and b are:
Ui(a|ta) = 1− q2;Ui(b|ta) = q2;Ui(a|tb) = (1− q)2; and
Ui(b|tb) = 1− (1− q)2.
Since q2 > 1/2, this implies that Ui(b|ti) > Ui(a|ti) for all i ∈ N
and ti ∈ Ti.
Set T ∗ = T as the set of type profiles with which the planner
is concerned. Consider the ‘‘majoritarian’’ SCF, f : T → A, which
chooses a when at least two agents are of type ta and b when at
least two agents are of type tb. This SCF f clearly satisfies incentive
compatibility and closure trivially. However, f does not satisfy
Bayesian monotonicity, hence it is not implementable. To see this
consider the single-valued deception βi(ti) = tb for all i ∈ N
and ti ∈ Ti. Note first that f ◦ β ̸≈ f . Since f (β(t)) = b for
all t ∈ T and Ui(b|ti) > Ui(a|ti) for all i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti, there
do not exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and y : T−i → ∆(A) such that
Ui(y ◦ β|ti) > Ui(f ◦ β|ti).
I now propose a slight modification of the previous example.
I keep the same set of players (N = {1, 2, 3}), the same set of
pure outcomes (A = {a, b}), and the same set of types for agents
1 and 2 but add one extra type tc to the set of types of agent 3
so that T3 now becomes {ta, tb, tc}. Hence, I set Tˆi = {ta, tb} for
each i ∈ {1, 2} and Tˆ3 = {ta, tb, tc}. For each agent i ∈ N and
ti ∈ Tˆi, each type ti’s interim belief πˆi[ti] is provided as the same
as before: for any t−i ∈ Tˆ−i,
πˆi(ti)[t−i] =
⎧⎨⎩ q
2 if t−i = (tb, tb)
q(1− q) if t−i = (tb, ta) or (ta, tb)
(1− q)2 if t−i = (ta, ta)
This implies that every type of agents 1 and 2 never believes
that agent 3 is of type tc . Therefore, this (slightly) expanded type
space Tˆ is the one without common support priors. Agents have
identical preferences such that for each i ∈ N and t ∈ Tˆ ,
uˆi(a; t) =
{ 1 if at least two agents are of type ta and t3 ̸= tc,
1 if t3 = tc,
0 otherwise;
uˆi(b, t) =
{
1 if at least two agents are of type tb and t3 ̸= tc,
0 otherwise,
Let Eˆ = (A, {uˆi, Tˆi, πˆi}i∈N ) denote the corresponding environment.
Set Tˆ = T ∗ as the set of type profiles with which the planner is
concerned. I slightly modify the previous SCF f into fˆ as follows:
for any t ∈ Tˆ ,
fˆ (t) =
{
b if at least two agens are of type tb and t3 ̸= tc
a otherwise
It is easy to see that this modified SCF fˆ still satisfies in-
centive compatibility and closure. I now show that the SCF fˆ
satisfies Bayesian monotonicity. Since every SCF trivially satisfies
the convex-range property, this together with Proposition 3 in
the previous section implies that fˆ also satisfies mixed Bayesian
monotonicity. Note that this example depicts an economy with
common values and the SCF fˆ specifies the best outcome in every
state. So, to verify Bayesian monotonicity, I only need to show
that for any deception β , whenever f ◦ β ̸≈ f , there exist agent
i ∈ N , type ti ∈ Tˆi, and an SCF y : Tˆ−i → ∆(A) with the following
preference reversal:
Ui(y ◦ β−i|ti) > Ui(fˆ ◦ β|ti).
Before checking Bayesian monotonicity, I make the following
observations: first, since fˆ satisfies incentive compatibility, one
can ignore unilateral deceptions from the profile of truth-telling.
Second, there is no need to consider a deception of type tc
because, due to the construction of fˆ , type tc obtain the best
outcome a from fˆ by announcing tc regardless of the types of the
other agents. So, I always assume β3(tc) = tc for any deception β .
Given this consideration, the task here reduces to checking the
following 10 cases of possible deceptions and finding the right
preference reversal for each case.
Case 1: βi(ta) = βi(tb) = tb for each i ∈ N .
Choose agent 3 of type tc and define y(t−3) = a for all t−3 ∈
Tˆ−3. Since U3(f ◦ β|tc) = 0 and U3(y ◦ β−3|tc) = 1, we have
U3(y ◦ β−3|tc) > U3(fˆ ◦ β|tc).
Case 2: βi(ta) = βi(tb) = ta for each i ∈ N .
Choose agent 1 of type tb as a test agent and set y : Tˆ−1 →
∆(A) as follows: for each t−1 ∈ Tˆ−1,
y(t−1) =
{
b if t2 = t3 = ta
a otherwise.
Then, we compute the following:
U1(fˆ ◦ β|tb) = (1− q)2
U1(y ◦ β−1|tb) = q2 + 2q(1− q) = 1− (1− q)2.
Since q2 > 1/2, we obtain U1(y ◦ β−1|tb) > U1(fˆ ◦ β|tb).
Case 3-1: βi(ta) = tb and βi(tb) = ta for each i ∈ N .
Choose agent 1 of type tb as a test agent and define y : Tˆ−1 →
∆(A) as follows: for each t−1 ∈ Tˆ−1,
y(t−1) =
{
a if t2 = t3 = tb
b otherwise.
Then, we compute the following:
U1(fˆ ◦ β|tb) = (1− q)2
U1(y ◦ β−1|tb) = q2 + 2q(1− q) = 1− (1− q)2.
Since q2 > 1/2, we obtain U1(y ◦ β−1|tb) > U1(fˆ ◦ β|tb).
Case 3-2: βi(ta) = tb and βi(tb) = ta for each i ∈ {1, 2} and
β3(tb) = tc .
Choose agent 3 of type tb as a test agent and define y(t−3) = b
for each t−3 ∈ Tˆ−3. We compute the following:
U3(fˆ ◦ β|tb) = (1− q)2,
U3(y ◦ β−3|tb) = q2 + 2q(1− q) = 1− (1− q)2.
Since q2 > 1/2, we obtain U3(y ◦ β−3|tb) > U3(fˆ ◦ β|tb).
Case 4: There exists i ∈ N such that βi(ti) = ti for each ti ∈ Tˆi and
βj(ta) = βj(tb) = tb for each j ∈ N\{i}.
Without loss of generality, we can set i = 3. Then, choose
agent 1 of type ta as a test agent. Define y : Tˆ−1 → ∆(A) as
follows: for any t−i ∈ Tˆ−1,
y(t−1) =
{
b if t3 = tb
a otherwise.
We compute the following:
U1(fˆ ◦ β|ta) = q2,
U1(y ◦ β−1|ta) = q2 + (1− q)2 + q(1− q).
This implies U1(y ◦ β−1|ta) > U1(fˆ ◦ β|ta).
Case 5: There exists i ∈ N such that βi(ti) = ti for each ti ∈ Tˆi and
βj(ta) = βj(tb) = ta for each j ∈ N\{i}.
T. Kunimoto / Journal of Mathematical Economics 82 (2019) 247–263 253
Without loss of generality, we can set i = 3. Then, choose
agent 1 of type tb as a test agent. Define y : Tˆ−1 → ∆(A) as
follows: for any t−i ∈ Tˆ−1,
y(t−1) =
{
b if t3 = tb
a otherwise.
We compute the following:
U1(fˆ ◦ β|tb) = (1− q)2,
U1(y ◦ β−1|tb) = q2 + (1− q)2 + q(1− q).
This implies U1(y ◦ β−1|tb) > U1(fˆ ◦ β|tb).
Case 6-1: There exists i ∈ N such that βi(t3) = t3 for each t3 ∈ Tˆ3,
βj(ta) = tb and βj(tb) = ta for each j ∈ N\{i}.
Choose agent 3 of type tb as a test agent and set y(t−3) = b for
all t−3 ∈ Tˆ−3. Then we compute the following:
U3(fˆ ◦ β|tb) = 2q(1− q),
U3(y ◦ β−3|tb) = q2 + 2q(1− q).
This implies that U3(y ◦ β−3|tb) > U3(fˆ ◦ β|tb).
Case6-2: There exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that βi(ti) = ti for each
ti ∈ Tˆi, βj(ta) = tb and βj(tb) = ta for j ∈ {1, 2}\{i}, and β3(ta) = tb
and β3(tb) = tc .
Choose agent 1 of type tb as a test agent and define y : Tˆ−1 →
∆(A) as follows: for all t−1 ∈ Tˆ−1,
y(t−1) =
{
b if t2 = tb or t2 = ta and t3 = tc ,
a otherwise.
We compute the following:
U1(fˆ ◦ β|tb) = 2q(1− q),
U1(y ◦ β−1|tb) = 1.
This implies that U1(y ◦ β−i|tb) > U1(fˆ ◦ β|tb).
Case6-3: There exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that βi(ti) = ti for each
ti ∈ Tˆi, βj(ta) = tb and βj(tb) = ta for j ∈ {1, 2}\{i}, and β3(ta) = tc
and β3(tb) = ta.
Choose agent 1 of type tb as a test agent and define y : Tˆ−1 →
∆(A) as follows: for all t−1 ∈ Tˆ−1,
y(t−1) =
{
b if t2 = tb or t2 = ta and t3 = ta
a otherwise.
We then compute the following:
U1(fˆ ◦ β|tb) = q(1− q),
U1(y ◦ β−1|tb) = q2 + 2q(1− q).
This implies that U1(y ◦ β−1|tb) > U1(fˆ ◦ β|tb).
Case6-4: There exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that βi(ti) = ti for each
ti ∈ Tˆi, βj(ta) = tb and βj(tb) = ta for j ∈ {1, 2}\{i}, and
β3(ta) = β3(tb) = tc .
Choose agent 1 of type tb as a test agent and define y : Tˆ−1 →
∆(A) as follows: for each t−1 ∈ Tˆ−1,
y(t−1) =
{
b if t2 = tb or t2 = ta and t3 = tc ,
a otherwise.
We then compute the following:
U1(fˆ ◦ β|tb) = (1− q)2,
U1(y ◦ β−1|tb) = q2 + q(1− q)+ (1− q)2.
This implies that U1(y ◦ β−1|tb) > U1(fˆ ◦ β|tb).
For every possible deception, I found a test agent who has the
right preference reversal. Hence, fˆ satisfies Bayesian monotonic-
ity.
7. Sufficiency for mixed Bayesian implementation
In this section, I discuss the sufficient conditions for mixed
Bayesian implementation. First, I prepare some definitions. For
each SCF f ∈ F, define
Yi[f ] ≡
{
yi : T−i → ∆∗(A)|Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(yi|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ T ∗i
}
,
where ∆∗(A) is a finite subset of ∆(A). Yi[f ] describes the set of
SCFs that are at least as bad as the SCF f for agent i, regardless
of his type. Since T−i and ∆∗(A) are finite, Yi[f ] becomes a finite
set.18
I introduce a condition on SCSs, which plays an important role
in the sufficiency results (Theorems 1–3) later.
Definition 9. An SCS F satisfies the no-worst-rule condition
(NWR) if, for each f ∈ F , i ∈ N , ti ∈ T ∗i , and ψi ∈ ∆(T−i × T−i),
there exist two SCFs yi[f ; ti, ψi], y′i[f ; ti, ψi] ∈ Yi[f ] such that∑
t−i,t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i, t−i)ui(y
′
i[f ; ti, ψi](t ′−i); (ti, t−i))
>
∑
t−i,t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i, t−i)ui(yi[f ; ti, ψi](t ′−i); (ti, t−i)).
Remark. By NWR, I require that for any belief that type ti has
about both t−i and how types t−i pretend to be t ′−i in the direct
revelation mechanism, there be no total indifference among all
SCFs within Yi[f ]. This NWR is an incomplete information ana-
logue of the conditional-no-total-indifference condition of Berge-
mann and Morris (2011) and moreover it is extended so as to take
care of social choice ‘‘sets’’.
To illustrate the permissiveness of NWR, I will revisit the
example discussed in the previous section.
Example 2 (Permissiveness of NWR). To illustrate the permis-
siveness of NWR, we slightly modify the previous example in
Section 6 by adding the third alternative c to {a, b} so that A =
{a, b, c} and for each i ∈ N and t ∈ T , ui(c; t) = 0. We shall
show that the majoritarian SCF f , which was introduced in the
previous section, indeed satisfies NWR. As we will see below,
what is essential for the argument is not that there is a common
alternative c but that each agent has a different alternative like
c , which depends also on his belief.
Since all agents are symmetric, we focus on agent 1. Consider
type ta of agent 1 and fix ψ1 ∈ ∆(T−1 × T−1). Define
y1[f ; ta, ψ1] =
{ a with probability pa,
b with probability pb,
c with probability pc,
y′1[f ; ta, ψ1] =
⎧⎨⎩
a with probability p′a,
b with probability p′b,
c with probability p′c ,
to be the constant SCFs where p = (pa, pb, pc), p′ = (p′a, p′b, p′c) ∈
∆(A). We will choose particular values of p and p′ later. Since
y1[f ; ta, ψ1] and y′1[f ; ta, ψ1] are constant SCFs and the majori-
tarian SCF f chooses the best outcome in every state, we know
that y1[f ; ta, ψ1], y′1[f ; ta, ψ1] ∈ Y1[f ]. Define
qa =
∑
t ′−1∈T−1
{
ψ1(t ′−1, ta, ta)+ ψ1(t ′−1, ta, tb)+ ψ1(t ′−1, tb, ta)
}
,
18 In the Appendix, I will extend the range of yi from ∆∗(A) to ∆(A). Thus,
the finiteness of Yi[f ] is only made for simplifying the argument.
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qb =
∑
t ′−1∈T−1
ψ1(t ′−1, tb, tb),
where qa + qb = 1. Then, we compute the following:∑
t ′−1,t−1
ψ1(t ′−1, t−1)u1(y1[f ; ta;ψ1](t ′−1); ta, t−1) = paqa + pbqb,
∑
t ′−1,t−1
ψ1(t ′−1, t−1)u1(y
′
1[f ; ta;ψ1](t ′−1); ta, t−1) = p′aqa + p′bqb.
By choosing p′a > pa and p′b > pb (p
′
c < pc), we obtain the right
preference reversal regardless of the values of qa and qb. We can
make essentially the same argument for type tb. Hence, NWR can
be easily satisfied in this modified example.
Since Ti is finite, I define {tℓi }∞ℓ=1 as a countable support of
∆(T−i). Similarly, since T−i is finite, one can find {ψki }∞k=1 as a
countable support of ∆(T−i × T−i).
Since F satisfies NWR, for each f ∈ F and i ∈ N , I define the
uniform SCF y¯i[f ] as follows: there exist δ, η ∈ (0, 1) such that
y¯i[f ] ≡ (1− δ)(1− η)2
∞∑
ℓ=1
ηℓ−1
×
∞∑
k=1
δk−1
{
y′i[f ; tℓi , ψki ] + yi[f ; tℓi , ψki ]
}
.
I use this uniform SCF y¯i[f ] in the canonical mechanism I propose
later. I also use the following result later.
Lemma 1. Suppose that an SCS F satisfies NWR. Then, for all i ∈ N,
ti ∈ T ∗i , and φi ∈ ∆(T−i), there exist two lotteries (or constant SCFs)
αi[ti, φi], α′i [ti, φi] ∈ ∆(A) such that∑
t−i
φi(t−i)ui(α′i [ti, φi]; (ti, t−i)) >
∑
t−i
φi(t−i)ui(αi[ti, φi]; (ti, t−i)).
Remark. The property stated in this lemma is slightly stronger
than the version of the no-total-indifference condition used by
SV (2005, 2010).
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. ■
Following the previous argument, I denote by {tℓi }∞ℓ=1 its count-
able support of ∆(Ti) and by {φki }∞k=1 its countable support of
∆(T−i), respectively. For each i ∈ N , I define the uniform lottery
α¯i ∈ ∆(A) as follows: there exist δ, η ∈ (0, 1) such that
α¯i ≡ (1− δ)(1− η)2
∞∑
ℓ=1
ηℓ−1
∞∑
k=1
δk−1
{
α′i [tℓi , φki ] + αi[tℓi , φki ]
}
.
Finally, I define
α¯ ≡ 1
n
∑
i∈N
α¯i.
I use this uniform lottery α¯ in the canonical mechanism I propose
below and I am ready to provide a sufficiency result for mixed
Bayesian implementation.
Theorem 1. Suppose that there are at least three agents (n ≥ 3).
If an SCS F satisfies incentive compatibility, mixed Bayesian mono-
tonicity, closure, and NWR, then it is mixed Bayesian implementable.
Remark. The proof here builds upon the canonical mechanism
proposed in Proposition 1 of Oury and Tercieux (2012). Theorem
1 of SV (2010) uses a mechanism whose message space consists
of five components and each component is almost the same as
that in the canonical mechanism proposed below. In this sense,
the mechanism below is no more complex than that of SV (2010).
Proof. We prove this by constructing an implementing mecha-
nism Γ = (M, g). Each agent i sends a messagemi = (m1i ,m2i ,m3i ,
m4i ,m
5
i ) ∈ Mi where m1i ∈ T ∗i ; m2i ∈ F ; m3i ∈ N ={1, 2, . . .}; m4i = {m4i [f ]}f∈F where m4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] for each f ∈ F ;
and m5i ∈ ∆∗(A), which is a finite subset of ∆(A). Since the
type space T , the SCS F , each Yi[f ], and ∆∗(A) are all finite, each
message space Mi is made countable.
The outcome g(m) is determined by the following rules:
Rule 1: If there exists f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1 for all
j ∈ N , then g(m) = f (m1).
Rule 2: If there exist i ∈ N and f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f and
m3j = 1 for all j ̸= i and m2i ̸≈ f or m3i > 1, then
g(m) =
{
m4i [f ](m1−i) with probabiltiy m3i /(m3i + 1)
y¯i[f ](m1−i) with probability 1/(m3i + 1)
where y¯i[f ] is the uniform SCF defined previously.
Rule 3: In all other cases,
g(m) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m51 with probability m
3
1/n(m
3
1 + 1)
m52 with probability m
3
2/n(m
3
2 + 1)
...
...
m5n with probability m
3
n/n(m
3
n + 1)
α¯ with the remaining probability
where α¯ is the uniform lottery over A, as defined previously.
The proof is completed by a series of claims below.
Claim 1. For any Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ), m ∈ M,
and t ∈ T ∗: m ∈ supp(σ (·|t))⇒ m3j = 1 for each j ∈ N.
Proof of Claim 1. Fix a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ).
We focus on type ti of agent i. Suppose by way of contradiction
that supp(σi(·|ti)) contains a message mi such that m3i > 1. We fix
such mi and partition the messages of all agents but i as follows:
for each t ′−i ∈ T−i,
M∗−i(t
′
−i) =
{
m−i
⏐⏐ ∃f ∈ F s.t. m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1
for all j ̸= i and m1−i = t ′−i
}
,
and
Mˆ−i =
{
m−i
⏐⏐ m3j > 1 for some j ∈ N\{i} or ∃j,
k ∈ N\{i} s.t. m2j ̸≈ m2k
}
.
If∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i
σ−i(m−i|t−i) > 0,
then, we can set
φi(t−i) = γ · πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i
σ−i(m−i|t−i)
for any t−i ∈ T−i where the constant γ is chosen so that∑
t−i φi(t−i) = 1. Since F satisfies NWR, by Lemma 1, we know
that there exists mˆ5i ∈ ∆(A) such that∑
t−i
φi(t−i)ui(mˆ5i ; (ti, t−i)) >
∑
t−i
φi(t−i)ui(α¯; (ti, t−i)).
Define mˆi to be the same as mi except that m5i is replaced by mˆ
5
i
defined above and mˆ3i = m3i +1. Then, the above inequality allows
us to conclude the following:
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t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i
σ−i(m−i|t−i)
× [ui(g(mˆi,m−i); (ti, t−i))− ui(g(mi,m−i); (ti, t−i))] > 0.
This implies that Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σ−i)|ti) > Ui(g ◦ (mi, σ−i)|ti). Thus, mˆi
would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This contradicts
to our hypothesis that σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ).
For each t ′−i ∈ T−i, if∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i∈M∗−i(t ′−i)
σ−i(m−i|t−i) > 0,
then, we can set
ψi(t ′−i, t−i) ≡ γ · πi[ti](t−i)
∑
m−i∈M∗−i(t ′−i)
σ−i(m−i|t−i),
for any t−i ∈ T−i where the constant γ is chosen so that∑
t−i,t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i, t−i) = 1. Since F satisfies NWR, there exists
mˆ4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] such that∑
t−i,t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i, t−i)ui(mˆ
4
i [f ](t ′−i); (ti, t−i))
>
∑
t−i,t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i, t−i)ui(y¯i[f ](t ′−i); (ti, t−i)).
Define mˆi to be the same as mi except that m4i [f ] is replaced by
mˆ4i [f ] defined above and mˆ3i = m3i +1. Then, the above inequality
allows us to conclude the following:∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i
σ−i(m−i|t−i)
× [ui(g(mˆi,m−i); (ti, t−i))− ui(g(mi,m−i); (ti, t−i))] > 0.
This implies that Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σ−i)|ti) > Ui(g ◦ (mi, σ−i)|ti). Thus, mˆi
would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This contradicts
our hypothesis that σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ). ■
Claim 2. For any equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ), there exists f ∈ F such
that m2j ≈ f for each j ∈ N, tj ∈ T ∗j , and mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj)).
Proof of Claim 2. Fix an equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ). By the previous
claim, we have that for any t ∈ T ∗ and m ∈ supp(σ (·|t)), m3j = 1
for each j ∈ N . Suppose by way of contradiction that there exist
t ∈ T ∗ and i ∈ N such that supp(σi(·|ti)) contains a message mi
such that m3i = 1 and m2i ̸≈ m2k for some k ̸= i. Then, we fix such
mi and only need to consider the following two cases:
Case 1: there exist j, k ∈ N\{i} with j ̸= k such that m2i ̸≈
m2j , m
2
j ̸≈ m2k , and m2k ̸≈ m2i ; or
Case 2: there exists f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f for each j ̸= i
By our hypothesis, either Case 1 or Case 2 occurs with prob-
ability one. We focus on agent i of type ti throughout. First,
we assume Case 1 applies. We consider the following message
profiles of all agents but i:
Mˆ−i =
{
m−i
⏐⏐ ∃j, k ∈ N\{i}s.t.m2i ̸≈ m2j , m2j ̸≈ m2k, and m2k ̸≈ m2i }.
If∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i
σ−i(m−i|t−i) > 0,
then, we can set
φi(t−i) ≡ γ · πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i
σ−i(m−i|t−i),
for any t−i ∈ T−i where the constant γ is chosen so that∑
t−i φi(t−i) = 1. Since F satisfies NWR, by Lemma 1 and con-
tinuity of expected utility, there exists mˆ5i ∈ ∆∗(A) such that∑
t−i
φi(t−i)ui(mˆ5i ; (ti, t−i)) >
∑
t−i
φi(t−i)ui(α¯; (ti, t−i)).
Next we assume that Case 2 applies. We consider the following
messages of all agents but i: for each t ′−i ∈ T−i,
M∗−i(t
′
−i) =
{
m−i| ∃f ∈ F s.t. m2j ≈ f ∀j ̸= i and m1−i = t ′−i
}
.
For any t ′−i ∈ T−i, if∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i∈M∗−i(t ′−i)
σ−i(m−i|t−i) > 0,
then, we can set
ψi(t ′−i, t−i) ≡ γ · πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i∈M∗−i(t ′−i)
σ−i(m−i|t−i),
for any t−i ∈ T−i where the constant γ is chosen so that∑
t−i,t ′−i
ψi(t ′i , ti) = 1. Since F satisfies NWR, there exists mˆ4i [f ] ∈
Yi[f ] such that∑
t−i,t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i, t−i)ui(mˆ
4
i [f ](t ′−i); (ti, t−i))
>
∑
t−i,t ′−i
ui(y¯i[f ](t ′−i); (ti, t−i)),
Define mˆi to be the same as mi except that m4i [f ] is replaced by
mˆ4i [f ]; m5i is replaced by mˆ5i ; and mˆ3i = m3i +1. Then, we conclude
the following:∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i
σ−i(m−i|t−i)
× [ui(g(mˆi,m−i); (ti, t−i))− ui(g(mi,m−i); (ti, t−i))] > 0.
This implies that Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σ−i)|ti) > Ui(g ◦ (mi, σ−i)|ti). Thus, mˆi
would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This contradicts
our hypothesis that σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ). ■
Claim 3. For each f ∈ F , there exists an equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T )
such that for all j ∈ N and tj ∈ Ti:
mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj))⇒ mj = (tj, f , 1,m4j ,m5j )
for some m4j ∈ M4j and m5j ∈ M5j .
Proof of Claim 3. Fix f ∈ F . For each j ∈ N , define σj : Tj → Mj
satisfying the following properties: for each tj ∈ T ∗j and mj ∈ Mj,
whenever mj ∈ supp(σ 1j (·|tj)),
1. m1j = tj;
2. m2j = f ; and
3. m3j = 1.
Fix i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti. It only remains to show that σi(ti) is a
best response of type ti to σ−i. Observe that m5i is irrelevant for
the resulting outcome given σ−i. If type ti deviates from σi(ti) to
some mˆi where mˆ2i ̸≈ f or mˆ3i > 1, he can induce Rule 2. Then,
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there is always positive probability that y¯i[f ] is chosen and since
F satisfies NWR and all agents are truthful by our hypothesis, type
ti can be worse off by this deviation than playing σi(ti). Thus, the
only profitable deviation type ti can possibly have is to change
m1i but change neither m
2
i nor m
3
i . However, since all agents are
truthful by our hypothesis and f satisfies incentive compatibility,
this cannot be profitable. Thus, σi(ti) is a best response for type ti
to σ−i. ■
Claim 4. For each SCF f ∈ F and deception β , if there exists
an equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ) such that for each t ∈ T ∗, m ∈
supp (σ (·|t)), and j ∈ N,
mj = (t ′j , f , 1,m4j ,m5j )
for some (m4j ,m
5
j ) ∈ M4j ×M5j and t ′j ∈ βj(tj),
then, f ◦ β ∈ F .
Proof of Claim 4. Fix an SCF f ∈ F , a deception β , and an
equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ) as defined in the statement of the
claim. We argue by contradiction. Suppose f ◦ β /∈ F . Then, by
mixed Bayesian monotonicity, we have that for every collection
of {ψk}k∈N with each function ψk : Tk → ∆(Tk) such that for each
k ∈ N and tk, t ′k ∈ Tk,
ψk(t ′k|tk) > 0⇔ t ′k ∈ βk(tk),
there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and a function y∗ : T−i → ∆(A) such
that∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
t ′−i
ψ−i(t ′−i, t−i)
×
⎡⎣ui(y∗(t ′−i), (ti, t−i))−∑
t ′i
ψi(t ′i |ti)ui(f (t ′i , t ′−i); (ti, t−i))
⎤⎦ > 0,
where ψ−i(t ′−i|t−i) =
∏
j̸=i ψj(t
′
j |tj) and for all t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,∑
t−i
πi(t˜i)[t−i]ui(f (t˜i, t−i); (t˜i, t−i))
≥
∑
t−i
πi(t˜i)[t−i]ui(y∗(t−i), (t˜i, t−i)).
For each j ∈ N and t ′j ∈ Tj, define
Mj(t ′j ) ≡
{
mj ∈ Mj
⏐⏐⏐ m1j = t ′j} ,
and for each j ∈ N , tj ∈ Tj, and t ′j ∈ Tj, define
ψj(t ′j |tj) ≡
∑
mj∈Mj(t ′j )
σj(mj|tj).
In what follows, we focus on agent i of type ti as identified in
the condition of mixed Bayesian monotonicity. Assume by our
hypothesis that supp(σi(·|ti)) contains a message mi as such. For
each t ′−i ∈ T−i, define
M−i(t ′−i) =
∏
j̸=i
Mj(t ′j ).
For each t−i, t ′−i ∈ T−i, define
ψ−i(t ′−i|t−i) ≡
∑
m−i∈M−i(t ′−i)
σ−i(m−i|t−i).
Then, by mixed Bayesian monotonicity, we can set mˆ4i [f ] =
y∗ ∈ Yi[f ] so that∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
t ′−i
ψ−i(t ′−i, t−i)
×
⎡⎣ui(y∗(t ′−i), (ti, t−i))−∑
t ′i
ψi(t ′i |ti)ui(f (t ′i , t ′−i); (ti, t−i))
⎤⎦ > 0,
Define mˆi to be the same as mi except that m4i [f ] is replaced by
mˆ4i [f ] = y∗ and mˆ3i is chosen sufficiently large. Then, the above
inequality allows us to conclude the following:∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i
σ−i(m−i|t−i)
× [ui(g(mˆi,m−i); (ti, t−i))− ui(g(mi,m−i); (ti, t−i))] > 0.
That is, Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σ−i)|ti) > Ui(g ◦ (mi, σ−i)|ti). This implies that,
given σ−i of the other agents’ equilibrium strategies, mˆi can
increase his payoff by announcing mˆ3i sufficiently large, choosing
mˆ4i [f ] = y∗, and, as a result, inducing Rule 2. That is, mˆi is an even
better response to σ−i than mi. This contradicts our hypothesis
that σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ). ■
All four claims we have established above imply that (1) for
any f ∈ F , there exists σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ) such that g ◦ σ ≈ f ; and (2)
for any σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ), we have that g ◦ σ ∈ F . Thus, we complete
the proof of the theorem. ■
Next, I extend the previous result to the case of two agents.
The case of two agents is prevalent in the literature of contract
theory and industrial organization because one can interpret a
bilateral contracting problem as a mechanism design problem
with two agents. For the case of two agents, Dutta and Sen (1994)
establish the following necessary condition: for all f 1, f 2 ∈ F with
f 1 ̸≈ f 2, we must have Y1[f 2]∩Y2[f 1] ̸= ∅. To obtain a sufficiency
result, I slightly strengthen this necessary condition in a similar
fashion as NWR is defined:
Definition 10. An SCS F satisfies the intersection property if,
for each i ∈ {1, 2} = N , f i, f j ∈ F with f i ̸≈ f j, ti ∈ T ∗i ,
and ψi ∈ ∆(T−i × T−i), there exist yi[f j; ti, ψi] ∈ Yi[f j] and
yi[f i, f j; ti, ψi] ∈ Yi[f j] ∩ Yj[f i] such that∑
t−i,t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i, t−i)
[
ui(yi[f j; ti, ψi](t ′−i); (ti, t−i))
− ui(yi[f i, f j; ti, ψi](t ′−i); (ti, t−i))
]
> 0.
I establish the following theorem for the case of two agents:
Theorem 2. Let N = {1, 2} be the set of agents. If an SCS F satisfies
incentive compatibility, mixed Bayesian monotonicity, closure, NWR
and the intersection property, it is mixed Bayesian implementable.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. ■
Finally, I adapt Theorems 1 and 2 to the case of social choice
‘‘functions’’. Most importantly, I propose a single mechanism that
works simultaneously for the case of two agents as well as more
than two agents.
Theorem 3. If an SCF f satisfies incentive compatibility, Bayesian
monotonicity, and NWR, it is mixed Bayesian implementable.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. ■
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8. Mixed Nash implementation
In this section, I investigate the conditions for mixed Nash
implementation, which restrict its analysis to a complete informa-
tion environment. The objective of this section is to appropriately
adapt our Theorem 1 of mixed Bayesian implementation to com-
plete information environments. I start from the formal definition
of complete information.
Definition 11. (Ti, πi)i∈N is said to be a complete information
type space if every t ∈ T is a belief-closed subspace.
In the rest of the section, I assume that (T ∗i , π
∗
i )i∈N is a belief-
closed subspace in a complete information type space (Ti, πi)i∈N .
The solution concept I adopt here is Nash equilibrium. A strategy
profile σ ∈ Σ is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ (T ) if, for every
i ∈ N, t ∈ T , and σ ′i ∈ Σi,
ui(g(σ (t)); t) ≥ ui(g(σ ′i (ti), σ−i(t−i)); t),
where t = (ti, t−i). Let NEΓ (T ) denote the set of Nash equilibria of
the game Γ (T ). I now define Nash implementation.
Definition 12. An SCS F is mixed Nash implementable if there
exists a mechanism Γ such that g ◦NEΓ (T ) ≈ F . More specifically,
this requirement can be decomposed into the following two
properties: (1) for any SCF f ∈ F , there exists σ ∈ NEΓ (T ) such
that g ◦σ ≈ f ; and (2) for any σ ∈ NEΓ (T ), there exists fˆ ∈ F such
that g ◦ σ ≈ fˆ .
Remark. This definition is weaker than the one used by Maskin
(1999) in his mixed-strategy Nash implementation. An SCS F
is mixed Nash implementable ‘‘in the sense of Maskin’’ if the
following two conditions hold: (I) for every f ∈ F , there exists
σ ∈ NEΓ (T ) such that for any t ∈ T ∗ and m ∈ supp(σ (·|t)), g(m) =
f (t); and (II) for any σ ∈ NEΓ (T ), t ∈ T ∗, and m ∈ supp(σ (·|t)),
g(m) ∈ F (t). See also SV (2010, Section 5.1, pp. 783–4) for further
discussion.
Maskin (1999) proposes a monotonicity condition for (mixed)
Nash implementation.
Definition 13. An SCS F satisfiesMaskin monotonicity if, for any
f ∈ F and t, t ′ ∈ T ∗, whenever f (t ′) /∈ F (t), there exist i ∈ N and
α ∈ ∆(A) such that
ui(α; t) > ui(f (t ′); t)andui(f (t ′); t ′) ≥ ui(α; t ′).
In what follows, I establish three preliminary results (Lemma 2
and Propositions 5 and 6) which allow us to unify Bayesian imple-
mentation and Nash implementation. I start from the result be-
low, which shows an equivalence between Bayesian monotonicity
and Maskin monotonicity in complete information environments
where incentive compatibility is satisfied.
Proposition 5. Suppose that (Ti, πi)i∈N is a complete information
type space and an SCS F satisfies incentive compatibility. Then, F
satisfies Maskin monotonicity if and only if it satisfies Bayesian
monotonicity.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. ■
I show that ‘‘every’’ SCS satisfies the convex range property.
Lemma 2. Suppose (Ti, πi)i∈N is a complete information type space.
Then, every SCS F satisfies the convex range property.
Proof. Fix f ∈ F and a collection of ‘‘single-valued’’ deceptions
{βλ}λ∈Λ such that f ◦ βλ ∈ F for each λ ∈ Λ. Assume that
there exists (not necessarily single-valued) deception β˜ such that
β˜(t) = ⋃λ βλ(t) for every t ∈ T ∗. Since every t ∈ T ∗ is a belief-
closed subspace under complete information, we can conclude
that f ◦ β˜(t) ∈ F (t) for every t ∈ T ∗, which implies f ◦ β˜ ∈ F .
■
The next result shows an equivalence between Maskin mono-
tonicity and mixed Bayesian monotonicity.
Corollary 1. Suppose that (Ti, πi)i∈N is a complete information type
space and an SCS F satisfies incentive compatibility. Then, F satis-
fies Maskin monotonicity if and only if it satisfies mixed Bayesian
monotonicity.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 5 and Lemma 2 ■
The next result shows that incentive compatibility becomes a
vacuous constraint in complete information environments where
there are at least three agents.
Proposition 6. Suppose that (Ti, πi)i∈N is a complete information
type space and there are at least three agents, i.e., n ≥ 3. Then, for
every SCS F , there exists an SCS Fˆ ≈ F such that Fˆ satisfies interim
incentive compatibility.
Proof. When there are at least three agents, any unilateral
deviation from the truth telling can be detected. Thus, incentive
compatibility trivially holds. ■
I introduce a significantly weaker version of NWR:
Definition 14. An SCS F satisfies the no-worst-alternative con-
dition (henceforth, NWA) if, for each f ∈ F and i ∈ N , there exists
an SCF yi[f ] : T → ∆(A) such that
ui(f (t); t) > ui(yi[f ](t); t)
for all t ∈ T ∗.
Remark. This is what Cabrales and Serrano (2011) proposed as
‘‘the no-worst-alternative’’ condition. In words, NWA says that
the SCS never assign the worst outcome to any agent at any state.
I obtain the following sufficiency result for mixed Nash imple-
mentation:
Theorem 4. Suppose that (Ti, πi)i∈N is a complete information type
space and there are at least three agents, i.e., n ≥ 3. If an SCS F
satisfies Maskin monotonicity and NWA, there exists an SCS Fˆ ≈ F
such that Fˆ is mixed Nash implementable.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. ■
9. Conclusion
The current paper identifies the no-worst rule condition
(NWR) as a mild condition under which mixed Bayesian imple-
mentation is fully characterized. In so doing, I assess, by means
of examples, the implications of the common prior assumption
in mixed Bayesian implementation. I also cover the case of two
agents, social choice functions, and Nash implementation under
complete information. The main contribution of this paper is to
propose a unification of the literature of Bayesian implementation
and Nash implementation in general environments including
non-economic ones.
I conclude this paper with what remains to be done. To ap-
preciate better this paper’s results, I believe providing a single
example that touches upon all the key ingredients simultaneously
is desirable. But I consider this endeavor challenging at this stage
so that I want to leave it as a future work.
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Appendix
In this section, I provide all the omitted proofs of the results
of the paper.
A.1. Proof of Proposition 3
By definition, it is clear that mixed Bayesian monotonicity
implies Bayesian monotonicity.
Now, we shall show the converse. Suppose that F satisfies
Bayesian monotonicity. Fix f ∈ F . Consider a ‘‘non’’ single-valued
deception β˜ such that f ◦ β˜ /∈ F and a collection of {ψk}k∈N with
each function ψk : Tk → ∆(Tk) such that for each k ∈ N and
tk ∈ Tk,
ψk(t ′k|tk) > 0⇔ t ′k ∈ β˜k(tk).
For this particular β˜ , one can find a collection of single-valued
deceptions {βλ}λ∈Λ together with Λ being the index set such that
(1) β˜ =⋃λ∈Λ βλ and (2) there do not exist λ, λ′ ∈ Λ with λ ̸= λ′
for which βλ(t˜) = βλ′ (t˜) for some t˜ ∈ T ∗. Since F satisfies the
convex range property, we can find a ‘‘single-valued’’ deception
β0 such that β0(t) ∈ β˜(t) for any t ∈ T and f ◦ β0 /∈ F . Since F
satisfies Bayesian monotonicity, there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and a
function y0 : T−i → ∆(A) such that
Ui(y0 ◦ β0−i|ti) > Ui(f ◦ β0|ti),
and for all t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y0|t˜i).
Recall that we have assumed that there exists a collection of
pure deceptions {βλ} such that β˜ = ⋃λ βλ. In particular, we
can assume without loss of generality that {βλ} is non-redundant,
i.e., it never be the case that there exist λ, λ′ ∈ Λ with λ ̸= λ′
such that βλ(t˜) = βλ′ (t˜) for some t˜ ∈ T ∗. For each t ′ = (t ′i , t ′−i) ∈
T , define
y˜(t ′i , t
′
−i) ≡
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
y0(t ′−i) if t
′
i = β0i (ti) and
t ′−i = β0−i(t˜−i) for some t˜−i
f (t ′i , t
′
−i) otherwise.
For each t ′−i ∈ T−i, we next define
y∗(t ′−i) ≡
∑
ti
ψi(t ′i |ti)y˜(t ′i , t ′−i).
Due to the construction of y∗ and Bayesian monotonicity for β0,
we obtain the following:
Ui(y∗ ◦ ψ−i|ti) = Ui(y˜ ◦ ψ |ti) > Ui(f ◦ ψ |ti).
Recall that F satisfies incentive compatibility. This is where the
argument of SV does not go through without incentive compati-
bility. Then, once again, due to the construction of y∗ and Bayesian
monotonicity for β0, we obtain the following: for any t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y∗|t˜i).
This shows that mixed Bayesian monotonicity holds. ■
A.2. Proof of Lemma 1
Fix i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and φi, φ˜i ∈ ∆(T−i). Fix f ∈ F as well. We
choose the constant γ so that
γ
∑
t−i,t ′−i
φ˜i(t ′−i)φi(t−i) = 1.
For each t−i, t ′−i ∈ T−i, define
ψi(t ′−i, t−i) = γ φ˜i(t ′−i)φi(t−i).
Since F satisfies NWR, there exist y′i[f ; ti, ψi], yi[f ; ti, ψi] ∈ Yi[f ]
such that∑
t−i,t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i, t−i)ui(y
′
i[f ; ti, ψi](t ′−i); (ti, t−i))
>
∑
t−i,t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i, t−i)ui(yi[f ; ti, ψi](t ′−i); (ti, t−i)).
Define
αi[ti, φi] =
∑
t ′−i
φ˜i(t ′−i)yi[f ; ti, ψi](t ′−i)andα′i [ti, φi]
=
∑
t ′−i
φ˜i(t ′−i)y
′
i[f ; ti, ψi](t ′−i).
Then, by construction of αi[ti, φi] and α′i [ti, φi], we rewrite the
above inequality:∑
t−i
φi(t−i)ui(α′i [ti, φi]; (ti, t−i)) >
∑
t−i
φi(t−i)ui(αi[ti, φi]; (ti, t−i)).
This completes the proof. ■
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2
Following the argument in Section 7, we denote by {tℓi }∞ℓ=1
its countable support of ∆(Ti). We denote its countable support
of ∆(T−i × T−i) by {ψki }∞k=1. If an SCS F satisfies the intersection
property, for all f , f ′ ∈ F with f ̸≈ f ′ and each i ∈ {1, 2}, we
define the uniform SCF y¯i[f , f ′] as follows: there exist δ, η ∈ (0, 1)
such that
y¯i[f , f ′] ≡ (1− δ)(1− η)
∞∑
ℓ=1
ηℓ−1
∞∑
k=1
δk−1yi[f , f ′; tℓi , ψki ].
Then, we define
y¯[f , f ′] = 1
2
y¯1[f , f ′] + 12 y¯2[f , f
′].
we use the uniform SCF y¯[f , f ′] in the canonical mechanism we
propose below.
We prove this by constructing an implementing mechanism
Γ = (M, g). Each agent i sends a message mi = (m1i ,m2i ,m3i ,m4i ,
m5i ) where m
1
i ∈ T ∗i , m2i ∈ F , m3i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}, m4i ={m4i [f ]}f∈F where m4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] for each f ∈ F , and m5i ∈ ∆∗(A).
Since the type space T , the SCS F , each Yi[f ], and ∆∗(A) are all
finite, each message space Mi is made countable.
The outcome g(m) is determined by the following rules:
Rule I: If there exist f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1 for all
j ∈ N , then g(m) = f (m1).
Rule II: If m3k = 1 for each k ∈ N and there exist f i, f j ∈ F with
f i ̸≈ f j such that m2i = f i and m2j = f j, then g(m) = y¯[f i, f j]
where y¯[f i, f j] is the uniform SCF defined previously.
Rule III: If there exist i ∈ N and f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f and
m3j = 1 for j ̸= i and m3i > 1, then
g(m) =
{
m4i [f ](m1−i) with probabiltiy m3i /(m3i + 1)
y¯i[f ](m1−i) with probability 1/(m3i + 1)
where y¯i[f ] is the uniform SCF defined in Section 7.
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Rule IV: In all other cases,
g(m) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m51 with probability m
3
1/n(m
3
1 + 1)
m52 with probability m
3
2/n(m
3
2 + 1)
...
...
m5n with probability m
3
n/n(m
3
n + 1)
α¯ with the remaining probability
where α¯ is the uniform lottery over A, as defined in Section 7.
We complete the proof by a series of claims below.
Claim I. For any equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ), m ∈ M, and t ∈ T ∗:
m ∈ supp(σ (·|t))⇒ m3j = 1 for each j ∈ N.
Proof of Claim I. This is essentially the same as the proof of
Claim 1 of Theorem 1. Hence, we skip the proof. ■
Claim II. For any equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ), there exists f ∈ F such
that m2j = f for each j ∈ N, tj ∈ T ∗j , mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj)).
Proof of Claim II. By the previous claim, we know that m3j = 1
for each j ∈ N, tj ∈ T ∗j , and mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj)). Suppose by way
of contradiction that there exist t ∈ T ∗ and m ∈ supp(σ (·|t)) such
that m2i = f i ̸≈ f j = m2j . We focus on agent i of type ti. We fix
such mi and consider the messages of agent j ̸= i as follows: for
each t ′j ∈ Tj,
M∗j (t
′
j ) =
{
mj| ∃f j ∈ F s.t. m2j ≈ f j and m3j = 1 and m1j = t ′j
}
.
For each t ′j ∈ Tj, if∑
tj
πi(ti)[tj]
∑
m−i∈M∗j (t ′j )
σj(mj|tj) > 0,
then, we can set
ψi(t ′j , tj) ≡ γ · πi(ti)[tj]
∑
mj∈M∗j (t ′j )
σj(mj|tj)
for any tj ∈ Tj where the constant γ is chosen so that∑
tj,t ′j
ψi(t ′j , tj) = 1. Since F satisfies the intersection property,
there exists mˆ4i [f j] ∈ Yi[f j] such that∑
tj,t ′j
ψi(t ′j , tj)ui(mˆ
4
i [f j](t ′j ); ti, tj) >
∑
tj,t ′j
ψi(t ′j , tj)ui(y¯[f i, f j](t ′j ); ti, tj).
Define mˆi to be the same as mi except that m4i [f j] is replaced by
mˆ4i [f j] defined above and mˆ3i > 1 sufficiently large. Then, the
above inequality allows us to conclude the following:∑
tj
πi(ti)[tj]
∑
mj
σj(mj|tj)ui(g(mˆi,mj); ti, tj)
>
∑
tj
πi(ti)[tj]
∑
mj
σj(mj|tj)ui(g(mi,mj); ti, tj)
This implies that Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σj)|ti) > Ui(g ◦ (mi, σj)|ti). Thus, mˆi
would be an even better response for type ti to σj than mi. This
contradicts our hypothesis that σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ). ■
Claim III. For each f ∈ F , there exists an equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T )
such that for all j ∈ N and tj ∈ Tj:
mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj))⇒ mj = (tj, f , 1,m4j ,m5j )
for some m4j ∈ M4j and m5j ∈ M5j .
Proof of Claim III. Fix f ∈ F . For each j ∈ N , define a function
σj : Tj → Mj satisfying the following properties: for each tj ∈ T ∗j
and mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj)),
1. m1j = tj;
2. m2j = f ; and
3. m3j = 1.
Fix i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti. Then, it only remains to show that
σi(ti) is a best response of type ti to σ−i. Observe first that m5i is
irrelevant for the resulting outcome given σ−i. Let us denote by mˆi
a deviation strategy of type ti. Assume that mˆi has the property
that mˆ2i = 1 and mˆ2i = f ′ ̸≈ f so that it induces Rule II. Then,
the lottery y¯[f ′, f ] is chosen so that type ti is worse off with mˆi
than σi(ti). Suppose that mˆi has the property that mˆ3i > 1 so
that it induces Rule III. Then, there is always positive probability
that y¯i[f ] is chosen so that type ti is worse off with mˆi than
σi(ti). Therefore, the only profitable deviation type ti can possibly
have is to change σ 1i (ti) into mˆ
1
i but change neither m
2
i nor m
3
i .
However, since the other agent j ̸= i is truthful by our hypothesis
and f satisfies incentive compatibility, this cannot be profitable.
Thus, σi(ti) is a best response of type ti to σ−i. ■
Claim IV. For each f ∈ F and deception β , if there exists an
equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ) such that for each j ∈ N, tj ∈ Tj, and
mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj)),
mj = (t ′j , f , 1,m4j ,m5j )for some (m4j ,m5j ) and t ′j ∈ βj(tj),
then, f ◦ β ∈ F .
Proof of Claim IV. This is the same as the proof of Claim 4 of
Theorem 1. Hence, we skip the proof. ■
All four claims we have established above imply that (1) for
any f ∈ F , there exists σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ) such that g ◦ σ ≈ f ; and (2)
for any σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ), we have that g ◦ σ ∈ F . Thus, we complete
the proof of the theorem. ■
A.4. Proof of Theorem 3
First, since every SCF satisfies closure, we no longer need this
condition in the statement of the theorem. Second, the intersec-
tion property is vacuously satisfied for SCFs because it never be
the case that two agents disagree on the SCF to be implemented.
Recall also that every SCF satisfies the convex range property. So,
given incentive compatibility, by Proposition 3, we can exploit the
equivalence between mixed Bayesian monotonicity and Bayesian
monotonicity. Thus, in the statement of the theorem, we replace
mixed Bayesian monotonicity with just Bayesian monotonicity.
We prove this by constructing an implementing mechanism Γ =
(M, g). Each agent i sends a message mi = (m1i ,m2i ,m3i ,m4i )
where m1i ∈ T ∗i which is finite, m2i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}, the set
of positive integers, m3i ∈ Yi[f ] which is finite, and m4i ∈ ∆∗(A)
which is a finite subset of ∆(A). Therefore, each Mi can be made
countable.
The outcome g(m) is determined by the following rules:
Rule A: If m2i = 1 for all i ∈ N , then g(m) = f (m1).
Rule B: If there exists i ∈ N such that m2j = 1 for all j ̸= i and
m2i > 1, then
g(m) =
{
m3i (m
1
−i) with probabiltiy m
2
i /(m
2
i + 1)
y¯i[f ](m1−i) with probability 1/(m2i + 1)
where y¯i[f ] is the uniform SCF as defined in Section 7.
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Rule C: In all other cases,
g(m) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m41 with probability m
2
1/n(m
2
1 + 1)
m42 with probability m
2
2/n(m
2
2 + 1)
...
...
m4n with probability m
2
n/n(m
2
n + 1)
α¯ with the remaining probability
where α¯ is the uniform lottery as defined in Section 7.
The proof of this theorem is essentially the same as that of
Theorem 1 for SCSs. As in the proof of Theorem 1, the proof
consists of a series of claims.
Claim A. For any equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ), m ∈ M, and t ∈ T ∗:
m ∈ supp (σ (·|t))⇒ m2i = 1 for each i ∈ N.
Claim B. There exists an equilibrium σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ) such that for
all i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti, σi(·|ti) assigns probability one on mi =
(ti, 1,m3i ,m
4
i ) for some m
3
i ∈ M3i and m4i ∈ M4i .
Claim C. For each deception β , if there exists an equilibrium σ ∈
BNEΓ (T ) such that for each t ∈ T ∗, m ∈ supp (σ (·|t)), and j ∈ N,
mj = (t ′j , 1,m3j ,m4j )for some (m3j ,m4j ) and t ′j ∈ βj(tj),
then, f ◦ β ≈ f .
Claim A corresponds to Claim 1; Claim B corresponds to
Claim 3; and Claim C corresponds to Claim 4 in Theorem 1. Hence,
we skip all the proofs for Claims A–C. All three claims we have
established above imply that (1) there exists σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ) such
that g ◦ σ ≈ f ; and (2) for any σ ∈ BNEΓ (T ), we have g ◦ σ ≈ f .
Thus, we complete the proof of the theorem. ■
A.5. Proof of Proposition 5
(⇐) Suppose that F satisfies Bayesian monotonicity. Fix f ∈ F .
Assume that there exist t, t ′ ∈ T ∗ such that f (t ′) ∈ F (t). Define β
as a single-valued deception with the following property: for any
i ∈ N and t˜i ∈ Ti,
βi(t˜i) =
{
t ′i if t˜i = ti
t˜i otherwise.
By construction of β above and Bayesian monotonicity of F , we
have the following: there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and a function
y∗ : T−i → ∆(A) such that
Ui(y∗ ◦ β−i|ti) > Ui(f ◦ β|ti),
while for all t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y∗|t˜i).
Define α = y∗(β−i(t−i)) = y∗(t ′−i) ∈ ∆(A). Note that f (β(t)) =
f (t ′). Since we focus on a complete information environment, by
Bayesian monotonicity, we obtain the following:
ui(α; t) > ui(f (t ′); t)andui(f (t ′); t ′) ≥ ui(α; t ′).
Thus, F also satisfies Maskin monotonicity.
(⇒) Suppose that F satisfies Maskin monotonicity. Fix f ∈ F
and β as a single-valued deception such that f ◦ β /∈ F . Since
we assume that f ◦ β /∈ F , there must exist t, t ′ ∈ T ∗ such that
f (t ′) /∈ F (t) and t ′ = β(t). Fix such t and t ′. Since F satisfies
Maskin monotonicity, there exist i ∈ N and α ∈ ∆(A) such that
ui(α; t) > ui(f (t ′); t)andui(f (t ′); t ′) ≥ ui(α; t ′).
Define y∗ : T−i → ∆(A) as follows: for any t˜−i,
y∗(t˜−i) =
{
α if t˜−i = t ′−i
f (t ′i , t˜−i) otherwise.
Since we focus on a complete information environment, by con-
struction of y∗ and Maskin monotonicity of F , we have
Ui(y∗ ◦ β−i|ti) > Ui(f ◦ β|ti).
Since F satisfies incentive compatibility and we focus on a com-
plete information environment, by construction of y∗ and Maskin
monotonicity of F , we have the following: for any t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y∗|t˜i).
Thus, F satisfies Bayesian monotonicity. ■
A.6. Proof of Theorem 4
Recall the definition of Yi[f ]:
Yi[f ] ≡
{
yi : T−i → ∆∗(A)|Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(yi|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ T ∗i
}
,
where ∆∗(A) is a finite subset of ∆(A). By NWA, Yi[f ] is al-
ways nonempty. We prove this by constructing an implementing
mechanism Γ = (M, g). Each agent i sends a message mi =
(m1i ,m
2
i ,m
3
i ,m
4
i ,m
5
i ) ∈ Mi where m1i ∈ Ti, m2i ∈ F , m3i ∈ N ={1, 2, . . .}, m4i = {m4i [f ]}f∈F where m4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] for each f ∈ F ,
and m5i ∈ ∆∗(A). Since the type space T , the SCS F , each Yi[f ], and
∆∗(A) are all finite, each Mi is made countable.
Since T is finite,∆(T ) has a countable support. Thus, we denote
by {tℓ}∞ℓ=1 its countable support of ∆(T ). Fix f ∈ F . Since F
satisfies NWA, we can define a uniform lottery y¯i[f ] as follows:
y¯i[f ] ≡ (1− δ)2
∞∑
ℓ=1
δℓ−1
{
f (tℓ)+ yi[f ](tℓ)
}
for some δ ∈ (0, 1). We fix some f¯ ∈ F and define another
uniform lottery α¯ as follows:
α¯ ≡ (1− δ)
2n
∑
i∈N
∞∑
ℓ=1
δℓ−1
{
f¯ (tℓ)+ yi[f¯ ](tℓ)
}
.
These {{y¯i[f ]}f∈F }i∈N and α¯ will be used in the canonical mecha-
nism.
The outcome g(m) is determined by the following rules:
Rule i: If there exists f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1 for all
j ∈ N , then g(m) = f (m1).
Rule ii: If there exist i ∈ N and f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f and
m3j = 1 for all j ̸= i and m2i ̸≈ f or m3i > 1, then
g(m) =
{
m4i [f ](m1−i) with probabiltiy m3i /(m3i + 1)
y¯i[f ] with probability 1/(m3i + 1)
where y¯i[f ] is the uniform lottery over A we defined previously
using NWA.
Rule iii: In all other cases,
g(m) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m51 with probability m
3
1/n(m
3
1 + 1)
m52 with probability m
3
2/n(m
3
2 + 1)
...
...
m5n with probability m
3
n/n(m
3
n + 1)
α¯ with the remaining probability
where α¯ is the uniform lottery over A we defined previously
using NWA. Note that closure becomes vacuous under a complete
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information type space. When there are at least three agents, by
Proposition 6, we can find an SCS Fˆ ≈ F such that Fˆ satisfies
incentive compatibility. In what follows, we focus on the SCS Fˆ
and will prove that Fˆ is Nash implementable by the canonical
mechanism proposed above. After we observe that any Bayesian
Nash equilibrium reduces to a Nash equilibrium under complete
information, the proof of the theorem is essentially the same
as that of Theorem 1 but the main difference from Theorem 1
is that one can weaken NWR into NWA and mixed Bayesian
monotonicity into Maskin monotonicity, respectively.
The proof consists of a series of claims.
Claim i. For any equilibrium σ ∈ NEΓ (T ), m ∈ M, and t ∈ T ∗:
m ∈ supp(σ (·|t))⇒ m3i = 1 for each i ∈ N.
Proof of Claim i. Since we consider a complete information
type space, the following fact is commonly certain among all
the agents: there exists a collection of {ϕi}i∈N for which each
ϕi : T ∗i → T−i is a function such that for each t ∈ T ∗, i, j ∈ N , we
have (ti, ϕi(ti)) = (tj, ϕj(tj)) = t .
Fix a Nash equilibrium σ ∈ NEΓ (T ). We focus on type ti of agent
i. Suppose by way of contradiction that supp(σi(·|ti)) contains a
message mi such that m3i > 1. We fix such mi and partition the
messages of all agents but i as follows: for each t ′−i ∈ T−i,
M∗−i(t
′
−i) =
{
m−i| ∃f ∈ F s.t. m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1
for all j ̸= i and m1−i = t ′−i
}
,
and
Mˆ−i = {m−i| m3j > 1
for some j ∈ N\{i} or ∃j, k ∈ N\{i} s.t. m2j ̸≈ m2k}.
If∑
m−i∈Mˆ−i
σ−i(m−i|ϕi(ti)) > 0,
then, since F satisfies NWA, we know that there exists mˆ5i ∈ ∆(A)
such that
ui(mˆ5i ; ti, ϕi(ti)) > ui(α¯; ti, ϕi(ti)).
For each t ′−i ∈ T−i, if∑
m−i∈M∗−i(t ′−i)
σ−i(m−i|ϕi(ti)) > 0,
then, we can set
ψi(t ′−i) ≡ γ
∑
m−i∈M∗−i(t ′−i)
σ−i(m−i|ϕi(ti))
where the constant γ is chosen so that
∑
t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i) = 1. Since F
satisfies NWA, there exists mˆ4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] such that∑
t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i)ui(mˆ
4
i [f ](t ′−i); ti, ϕi(ti)) > ui(y¯i[f ]; ti, ϕi(ti)).
Define mˆi to be the same as mi except that m4i [f ] is replaced by
mˆ4i [f ] and m5i is replaced by mˆ5i ; and mˆ3i = m3i + 1. Then, the
above inequality allows us to conclude the following:∑
m−i
σ−i(m−i|ϕi(ti))ui(g(mˆi,m−i); ti, ϕi(ti))
>
∑
m−i
σ−i(m−i|ϕi(ti))ui(g(mi,m−i); ti, ϕi(ti)).
Thus, mˆi would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This
contradicts our hypothesis that σ ∈ NEΓ (T ). ■
Claim ii. For any equilibrium σ ∈ NEΓ (T ), there exists f ∈ Fˆ such
that m2j = f for each j ∈ N, tj ∈ T ∗j , and mj ∈ supp (σj(·|tj)).
Proof of Claim ii. Fix an equilibrium σ ∈ NEΓ (T ). By the previous
claim, for any j ∈ N, t ∈ T , and m ∈ supp(σ (·|t)), we have
m3j = 1. Suppose on the contrary that there exist t ∈ T ∗, m ∈
supp(σ (t)), and i, k ∈ N with i ̸= k such that m2i ̸≈ m2k . Then, we
fix such mi and only need to consider the following two cases:
either
Case 1: there exist j, k ∈ N\{i} with j ̸= k such that m2i ̸≈
m2j , m
2
j ̸≈ m2k , and m2k ̸≈ m2i ; or
Case 2: there exists f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f for all j ̸= i.
By our hypothesis, either Cases 1 or 2 occur with probability
one. We focus on agent i of type ti. We first assume that Case 1
applies. We consider the following messages of all agents but i:
Mˆ−i = {m−i| ∃j, k ∈ N\{i}
s.t. m2i ̸≈ m2j , m2j ̸≈ m2k , and m2k ̸≈ m2i
}
.
If∑
m−i∈Mˆ−i
σ−i(m−i|ϕi(ti)) > 0,
then, since F satisfies NWA, there exists mˆ5i ∈ ∆(A) such that
ui(mˆ5i ; ti, ϕi(ti)) > ui(α¯; ti, ϕi(ti)).
We next assume that Case 2 applies. We consider the follow-
ing messages of all agents but i: for each t ′−i ∈ T−i,
M∗−i(t
′
−i) =
{
m−i| ∃f ∈ Fs.t. m2j ≈ f ∀j ̸= i and m1−i = t ′−i
}
.
For each t ′−i ∈ T−i, if∑
m−i∈M∗−i(t ′−i)
σ−i(m−i|ϕi(ti)) > 0,
then, we can set
ψi(t ′−i) ≡ γ
∑
m−i∈M∗−i(t ′−i)
σ−i(m−i|ϕi(ti))
where the constant γ is chosen so that
∑
t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i) = 1. Since F
satisfies NWA, there exists mˆ4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] such that∑
t ′−i
ψi(t ′−i)ui(mˆ
4
i [f ](t ′−i); ti, ϕi(ti)) > ui(y¯i[f ]; ti, ϕi(ti)).
Define mˆi to be the same as mi except that m4i [f ] is replaced by
mˆ4i [f ]; m5i by mˆ5i defined above and mˆ3i = m3i + 1. Then, we
conclude the following:∑
m−i
σ−i(m−i|ϕi(ti))ui(g(mˆi,m−i); ti, ϕi(ti))
>
∑
m−i
σ−i(m−i|ϕi(ti))ui(g(mi,m−i); ti, ϕi(ti)).
Thus, mˆi would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This
contradicts our hypothesis that σ ∈ NEΓ (T ). ■
Claim iii. For each f ∈ Fˆ , there exists an equilibrium σ ∈ NEΓ (T )
such that for all j ∈ N and tj ∈ Ti:
mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj))⇒ mj = (tj, f , 1,m4j ,m5j )
for some m4j ∈ M4j and m5j ∈ M5j .
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Proof of Claim iii. Fix f ∈ F . For each j ∈ N , define σj : Tj → Mj
satisfying the following properties: for each tj ∈ T ∗j and mj ∈
supp(σj(·|tj)),
1. m1j = tj;
2. m2j = f ; and
3. m3j = 1.
Fix i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti. It only remains to show that σi(ti) is a best
response to σ−i. Observe that m5i is irrelevant for the resulting
outcome given σ−i. If type ti deviates from σi(ti) to some mˆi
where mˆ2i ̸≈ f or mˆ3i > 1, he can induce Rule ii. Then, there
is always positive probability that y¯i[f ] is chosen and since F
satisfies NWA, type ti will be worse off than playing σi(ti). Thus,
the only profitable deviation type ti can possibly have is to change
m1i but change neither m
2
i nor m
3
i . However, since all agents are
truthful by our hypothesis and f satisfies incentive compatibility,
this cannot be profitable. Therefore, σi(ti) is a best response of ti
to σ−i. ■
Claim iv. For each SCF f ∈ Fˆ and deception β , if there exists a
Nash equilibrium σ ∈ NEΓ (T ) such that for each t ∈ T ∗, m ∈
supp (σ (·|t)), and j ∈ N,
mj = (t ′j , f , 1,m4j ,m5j )for some (m4j ,m5j ) and t ′j ∈ βj(tj),
then, f ◦ β ∈ Fˆ .
Proof of Claim iv. Note that the convex range property becomes
a vacuous constraint under a complete information type space.
By Propositions 3 and 6, we know that Fˆ satisfies mixed Bayesian
monotonicity. Therefore, this is the same as the proof of Claim 4
of Theorem 1. ■
All four claims we have established above imply that (1) for
any f ∈ Fˆ , there exists σ ∈ NEΓ (T ) such that g ◦ σ ≈ f ; and (2)
for any σ ∈ NEΓ (T ), we have that g ◦ σ ∈ Fˆ . Thus, we complete
the proof of the theorem. ■
A.7. Extension to a more general setup
I extend the analysis of this paper to a more general envi-
ronment with incomplete information. Assume that Ti is a Polish
space Ti associated with its Borel σ -algebra Ti. I endow T−i and T
with the product Borel σ -algebras T−i and T , respectively. Note
that T−i and T are also Polish spaces. Let ∆(T−i) denote the set of
probability distributions on measurable space (T−i,T−i) endowed
with the weak-* topology. Each agent i’s system of ‘‘interim’’
beliefs is expressed as a Ti-measurable function πi : Ti → ∆(T−i).
Then, I call (Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N a type space. Let A denote the set of
pure outcomes associated with its σ -algebra A containing all
singleton sets. Let ∆(A) be the set of probability distributions
over measurable space (A,A ). Agent i’s state dependent von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function is denoted ui : ∆(A) ×
T → R, which is assumed to be a A × T -measurable function. I
can now define an environment as E = (A,A , {ui, Ti,Ti, πi}i∈N).
A subset of T is called an event if it is T -measurable.19 An
event E = E1 × · · · × En ⊆ T is said to be belief-closed if, for
each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ei, we have πi[ti](E−i) = 1. I assume that
the planner only cares about the belief-closed subset of the type
space (T ∗i ,T
∗
i )i∈N where T
∗
i ⊆ Ti and T ∗i is its relative σ -algebra
for every i ∈ N .
19 Since T is the product measure, any event constitutes a product set.
A (stochastic) social choice function (SCF) is a T -measurable
function f : T → ∆(A). Let F be the collection of all T -
measurable SCFs. A social choice set (SCS) F is defined as a
nonempty subset of F. Two SCSs F and H are said to be equivalent
(F ≈ H) if there exists a bijection ξ : F → H such that
sup {|f (A|t)− h(A|t)| : t ∈ T ∗, A ∈ A } = 0 for every f ∈ F and
every h ∈ H satisfying h = ξ (f ). This means that the two SCSs
‘‘coincide’’ for every t ∈ T ∗.
A mechanism (or game form) Γ = ((Mi,Mi)i∈N , g) describes a
nonempty message space Mi for each agent i, equipped with a
σ -algebra Mi and an M -measurable outcome function g : M →
∆(A), where M = ×i∈NMi is associated with product σ -algebra
M .
The interim expected utility of agent i of type ti that pretends
to be of type t ′i in the direct-revelation mechanism associated
with an SCF f , provided all other agents are truthful is defined
as:
Ui(f ; t ′i |ti) ≡
∫
T−i
ui(f (t ′i , t−i); (ti, t−i))πi[ti](dt−i)
Denote Ui(f |ti) = Ui(f ; ti|ti).
A.7.1. Mixed Bayesian implementation
Given a mechanism Γ = (M,M , g), let Γ (T ) denote an incom-
plete information game associated with a type space
(Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N . Let σi : Ti → ∆(Mi) denote a Ti-measurable mixed
strategy for agent i andΣi his set ofmixed strategies, where∆(Mi)
denotes the set of probability measures over (Mi,Mi) endowed
with the weak-* topology. Let σi(·|ti) ∈ ∆(Mi) denote the proba-
bility measure over (Mi,Mi) conditional upon ti. Besides, I denote
by σ (·|t) =∏j∈N σj(·|tj) ∈ ∏j∈N ∆(Mj) the product measure over
(M,M ) conditional upon t . I assume that g ◦ σ is a T × M -
measurable function and g ◦ σ ∈ F for every σ ∈ Σ . With abuse
of notation, I let
Ui(g ◦ (σ ′i , σ−i)|ti)
≡
∫
T−i
∫
M−i
∫
Mi
ui(g(mi,m−i);
×(ti, t−i))σ ′i (dmi|ti)σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i).
A.7.2. Necessity for mixed Bayesian implementation
This paper discusses three necessary conditions: (1) incentive
compatibility; (2) closure; and (3) mixed Bayesian monotonicity.
When dealing with a more general setup, one needs no modifi-
cation for incentive compatibility. The only modification I need
for defining closure in a more general case is the measurability
requirement for events. More specifically, a subset of T is said to
be an event if it is T -measurable. Finally, the only modification
one needs for mixed Bayesian monotonicity is the requirement
that each deception βi : Ti → 2Ti\{∅} is Ti-measurable and each
mapping ψk : Tk → ∆(Tk) is Tk-measurable.
A.7.3. Sufficiency for mixed Bayesian implementation
In this section, I discuss how one can extend Theorem 1 (suf-
ficiency for mixed Bayesian implementation) to a more general
setup. For each SCF f ∈ F, define
Yi[f ] ≡
{
yi : T−i → ∆(A)
⏐⏐⏐⏐ yi is T−i-measurable andUi(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(yi|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ T ∗i
}
.
The set Yi[f ] is associated with its Borel σ -algebra Yi[f ].
Since Ti is a Polish space, ∆(Ti) can also be made Polish. I
denote by {tℓi }∞ℓ=1 its countable dense subset of ∆(Ti). Similarly,
T. Kunimoto / Journal of Mathematical Economics 82 (2019) 247–263 263
since T−i × T−i is a Polish space, ∆(T−i × T−i) can also be made
Polish. So, I denote by {ψki }∞k=1 its countable dense subset of
∆(T−i × T−i). Since F satisfies NWR, for each f ∈ F and i ∈ N ,
I define the uniform SCF y¯i[f ] as follows: there exist δ, η ∈ (0, 1)
such that
y¯i[f ] ≡ (1− δ)(1− η)2
∞∑
ℓ=1
ηℓ−1
×
∞∑
k=1
δk−1
{
y′i[f ; tℓi , ψki ] + yi[f ; tℓi , ψki ]
}
.
Recall that this uniform SCF y¯i[f ] is used in the canonical mech-
anism for Theorem 1. Note also that {tℓi }∞ℓ=1 is a dense subset of
∆(Ti) and {ψki }∞k=1 is a dense subset of ∆(T−i × T−i), respectively.
As expected utilities are continuous in both ∆(Ti) and ∆(T−i ×
T−i), NWR together with the uniform SCF y¯i[f ] plays exactly the
same role in the proof of Theorem 1 as if the type space is
countable.
Similarly, for each i ∈ N , I define the uniform lottery α¯i ∈ ∆(A)
as follows: there exist δ, η ∈ (0, 1) such that
α¯i ≡ (1− δ)(1− η)2
∞∑
ℓ=1
ηℓ−1
∞∑
k=1
δk−1
{
α′i [tℓi , φki ] + αi[tℓi , φki ]
}
.
Finally, I define
α¯ ≡ 1
n
∑
i∈N
α¯i.
Recall that this uniform lottery α¯ is used in the canonical mech-
anism of Theorem 1. Note also that {tℓi }∞ℓ=1 is a dense subset of
∆(Ti) and {ψki }∞k=1 is a dense subset of ∆(T−i × T−i), respectively.
Once again, as expected utilities are continuous in both ∆(Ti) and
∆(T−i × T−i), NWR (more precisely, Lemma 1) together with the
uniform lottery α¯ plays exactly the same role in the proof of
Theorem 1 as if the type space is countable.
I state the extension of Theorem 1 to a more general
setup.
Theorem 5. Suppose there are at least three agents (n ≥ 3). If an
SCS F satisfies incentive compatibility, mixed Bayesian monotonicity,
closure, and NWR, then it is mixed Bayesian implementable.
Proof. We use the same mechanism proposed in the proof of
Theorem 1. In the proposed mechanism Γ = (M,M , g), each
agent i sends a message mi = (m1i ,m2i ,m3i ,m4i ,m5i ) ∈ Mi where
m1i ∈ T ∗i , m2i ∈ F , m3i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}, m4i = {m4i [f ]}f∈F
where m4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] for each f ∈ F , and m5i ∈ ∆(A). The only
modification we need is to impose the measurability requirement
over the message space. Let Mi = Ti ×F × 2N ×∏f∈F Yi[f ] ×A
be its associated σ -algebra.
The rest of the proof is completed by appropriately adapting
that of Theorem 1 to the current setup. ■
It is easy to see that similar extensions can be established for
Theorems 2–4 as well.
References
Abreu, D., Matsushima, H., 1992. Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undomi-
nated Strategies: Incomplete Information. Mimeo, Princeton University.
Abreu, D., Matsushima, H., 1994. Exact implementation. J. Econom. Theory 64,
1–19.
Artemov, G., Kunimoto, T., Serrano, R., 2013. Robust virtual implementation:
Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine. J. Econom. Theory 148,
424–447.
Aumann, R., 1987. Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian
rationality. Econometrica 55, 1–18.
Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2009. Robust virtual implementation. Theor. Econ. 4,
45–88.
Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2011. Robust implementation in general mechanisms.
Games Econom. Behav. 71, 261–281.
Bergemann, D., Morris, S., Tercieux, O., 2011. Rationalizable implementation. J.
Econom. Theory 146, 1253–1274.
Brandenburger, A., Dekel, E., 1993. Hierarchies of beliefs and common
knowledge. J. Econom. Theory 59, 189–198.
Cabrales, A., Serrano, R., 2011. Implementation in adaptive better-response
dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms.
Games Econom. Behav. 73, 360–374.
Chakravorti, B., 1992. Efficiency and mechanisms with no regret. Internat.
Econom. Rev. 33, 45–59.
Chen, Y-C., Kunimoto, T., Sun, Y., 2016. Implementation with Transfers. Mimeo.
Duggan, J., 1997. Virtual Bayesian implementation. Econometrica 65,
1175–1199.
Dutta, B., Sen, A., 1994. Two-person Bayesian implementation. Econ. Des. 1,
41–54.
Jackson, M., 1991. Bayesian implementation. Econometrica 59, 461–477.
Jackson, M., 1992. Implementation in undominated strategies: A look at bounded
mechanisms. Rev. Econom. Stud. 59, 757–775.
Jackson, M., 2001. A crash course in implementation theory. Soc. Choice Welf.
18, 655–708.
Kunimoto, T., Serrano, R., 2011. A new necessary condition for implementation
in iteratively undominated strategies. J. Econom. Theory 146, 2583–2595.
Lipman, B., 2003. Finite order implications of common priors. Econometrica 71,
1255–1267.
Maskin, E., 1999. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Rev. Econ. Stud. 66,
23–38.
Matsushima, H., 1993. Bayesian monotonicity with side payments. J. Econom.
Theory 59, 107–121.
Mookherjee, D., Reichelstein, S., 1990. Implementation via augumented
revelation mechanism. Rev. Econom. Stud. 57, 453–476.
Muller, E., Satterthwaite, M.A., 1977. The equivalence of strong positive
association and strategy-proofness. J. Econom. Theory 14, 412?418.
Oury, M., Tercieux, O., 2012. Continuous implementation. Econometrica 80,
1605–1637.
Palfrey, T., Srivastava, S., 1987. On Bayesian implementable allocations. Rev.
Econom. Stud. 54, 193–208.
Palfrey, T., Srivastava, S., 1989a. Implementation with incomplete information in
exchagne economies. Econometrica 57, 115–134.
Palfrey, T., Srivastava, S., 1989b. Mechanism design with incomplete information:
A solution to the implementation problem. J. Political Econ. 97, 668–691.
Palfrey, T., Srivastava, S., 1993. Bayesian Implementation. Harwood Academic
Publishers.
Postlewaite, A., Schmeidler, D., 1986. Implementation in differential information
economies. J. Econom. Theory 39, 14–33.
Saijo, T., 1987. On constant maskin monotonic social choice functions. J. Econom.
Theory 42, 382–386.
Serrano, R., 2004. The theory of implementation of social choice rules. SIAM Rev.
46, 377–414.
Serrano, R., Vohra, R., 2005. A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementa-
tion. Games Econom. Behav. 50, 312–331.
Serrano, R., Vohra, R., 2010. Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A
unified approach to exact and approximate implementation. J. Math. Econom.
46, 775–785.
